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PUBLIC RESPONSE TO RACIST SPEECH: 
CONSIDERING THE VICTIM'S STORYt 
Mari J. Matsuda* 
!. INTRODUCTION 
A black family enters a coffee shop in a small Texas town. A white 
man places a card on their table. The card reads, "You have just been 
paid a visit by the Ku Klux Klan." The family stands and leaves. 1 
A law student goes to her dorm and finds an anonymous message 
posted on the door, a caricature image of her race, with a red line slashed 
through it. 2 
A Japanese-American professor arrives in an Australian city and finds 
a proliferation of posters stating "Asians Out or Racial War" displayed on 
telephone poles. She uses her best, educated inflection in speaking with 
clerks and cab drivers, and decides not to complain when she is 
overcharged. 3 
t © 1989 Mari J. Matsuda. All rights reserved. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of 
Law. B.A. 1975, Arizona State University; J.D. 1980, University of Hawaii; LL.M. 1983, 
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Amy Kastely, Charles Lawrence, Barbara Lubow, Toni Massaro, Richard Pildes, Frederick 
Schauer, Nadine Strossen, and Rene Todd for thoughtful responses to and, in some cases, disa· 
greement with, this Article in earlier drafts. Lila Gardner, Michael Reveal, and Whitney Rup· 
precht provided valuable research assistance. Finally, the author owes much to Richard 
Delgado, whose imaginative power in responding to the problem of racism is a source of constant 
inspiration. To all the members of the Michigan Law Review and to the authors in this sympo-
sium issue, thanks are due for your vision and collaborative support. 
1. Incidents such as this are described in P. StMS, THE KLAN 167-72 (1978). The calling 
card is a typical Klan technique. Id. at 168-72; see also Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights 
of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (A woman who allowed 
Vietnamese immigrants' fishing boats to use her docks received a card that read "You have been 
paid a 'friendly visit' do you want the next one to be a 'real one.' "). 
2. At the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, someone defaced a Black 
History Month display in just such a manner. Racist Caricatures Anger Students, Recorder (San 
Francisco), Feb. 11, 1989, at 1. Last October, two students at Stanford University drew a racist 
caricature on a poster on the door of a black residential hall, and were not disciplined by the 
school for their actions. Id. 
3. Author's personal experience, Perth, Western Australia, July 1987, recounted in Lan-
guage as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defa· 
mation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 337 (1989) (transcript of the James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, 
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, Nov. 4, 1988) [hereinafter Language as 
Violence]. I later learned that right-wing hate movements have been blamed for the firebombing 
of Chinese restaurants in Perth. Asian Immigrants Among Target of Australian Violence: Inquiry 
Scheduled, Pacific Citizen, Mar. 24, 1989, at 2, col. 4. 
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These unheralded stories share company with the more notorious 
provocation of swastikas at Skokie and burning crosses on suburban 
lawns. 4 The threat of hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the neo-
Nazi skinheads goes beyond their repeated acts of illegal violence.5 
Their presence and the active dissemination of racist propaganda 
means that citizens are denied personal security and liberty as they go 
about their daily lives. Professor Richard Delgado recognized the 
harm of racist speech in his breakthrough article, Words That 
Wound, 6 in which he suggested a tort remedy for injury from racist 
words. This Article takes inspiration from Professor Delgado's posi-
tion, and makes the further suggestion that formal criminal and ad-
ministrative sanction - public as opposed to private prosecution - is 
also an appropriate response to racist speech. 7 
In making this suggestion, this Article moves between two stories. 
The first is the victim's story of the effects of racist hate messages. The 
second is the first amendment's story of free speech. The intent is to 
respect and value both stories. This bipolar discourse uses as method 
what many outsider intellectuals do in silence: it mediates between 
different ways of knowing in order to determine what is true and what 
is just.8 
In calling for legal sanctions for racist speech, this Article rejects 
an absolutist first amendment position. It calls for movement of the 
societal response to racist speech from the private to the public realm.9 
The choice of public sanction, enforced by the state, is a significant 
one. The kinds of injuries and harms historically left to private indi-
viduals to absorb and resist through private means is no accident. 10 
4. Klanwatch listed 28 reported cross-burnings in 1988. KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE RE-
PORT, Feb. 1989, at 11. 
5. For reports of the escalating violence of hate groups, see id. See also CIVIL RIGHTS DIVI-
SION, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, YOUNG AND VIOLENT: THE GROWING 
MENACE OF AMERICA'S NEO-NAZI SKINHEADS 1 (1988) [hereinafter YOUNG AND VIOLENT]. 
6. Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Call-
ing, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). 
7. Some state and local governments have taken steps in this direction. See infra note 138. 
8. For elaboration of this point, see Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Con-
sciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). 
9. Lawrence Friedman has called the separation of public and private force "one of the great 
master trends in criminal justice." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 288 (2d ed. 
1985). A developing state typically moves to monopolize imposition of sanctions on offensive 
conduct. Friedman also notes that this movement occurs when "private justice is either too 
ineffective or, conversely too effective, giving rise to feuds and wholesale bloodshed." Id. at 293. 
For a tragic illustration of private remedy, see Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281 (10th 
Cir. 1978) (An African-American employee subjected to unrelenting and long-standing racist 
harassment at work warned white co-workers to stop harassing him. When a white employee 
continued taunting, knocking off the African-American employee's hat, the African-American 
employee assaulted the provocateur, and was discharged.). 
10. Analysis of the public-private split, suggesting its political implications, is found in femi-
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The places where the law does not go to redress harm have tended to 
be the places where women, children, people of color, and poor people 
live. 11 This absence of law is itself another story with a message, per-
haps unintended, about the relative value of different human lives. A 
legal response to racist speech is a statement that victims of racism are 
valued members of our polity. 
The call for a formal, legal-structural response to racist speech 
goes against the long-standing and healthy American distrust of gov-
ernment power. It goes against an American tradition of tolerance 
that is precious in the sense of being both valuable and fragile. 
Dean Lee Bollinger has concluded that a primary reason for the 
legal protection of hate speech is to reinforce our commitment to toler-
ance as a value. 12 If we can shore up our commitment to free speech 
in the hard and public cases, like Skokie, 13 perhaps we will internalize 
the need for tolerance and spare ourselves from regrettable error in 
times of stress. Given the real historical costs of state intolerance of 
minority views, the first amendment purpose identified by Dean Bol-
linger is not one lightly set aside. 
Recognizing both the real harm of racist speech and the need to 
strengthen our dangerously fickle collective commitment to freedom 
of discourse, this writer intends to feel and to work within the first 
amendment tension armed with stories from human lives. This Arti-
cle suggests in the following Part that outsider jurisprudence - juris-
prudence derived from considering stories from the bottom - will 
help resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflicts of value and doctrine 
that characterize liberal thought. Part III tells the victim's story of 
nist and critical literature. See, e.g., Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Ap-
proach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. I (1986); Olsen, The Family and the Market, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); see also Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay 011 
Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989) {discussing the effect of privatization 
of remedy on racial harm). 
11. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S.Ct. 998 {1989), denying 
state liability for third-party acts of child abuse, provides a recent tragic example. The historical 
response to racist harassment in this country has shifted with ambivalence between a public and 
private conception of appropriate penalties for racist speech. During the reconstruction period, 
several formal measures against race harassment were enacted. Subsequent enforcement was 
sporadic. See Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux 
Klan Trials 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984) {discussing early federal prosecutions for race 
harassment). Professor Charles Jones argues for a recommitment to the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendment promise of freedom through active federal prosecution for hate crimes. Jones, 
An Argument for Federal Protection Against Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 a11d the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 689 {1986). 
12. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1986). 
13. Collin v Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 
N.E.2d 347 (1977), modified, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
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the effects of racist hate speech. Part IV introduces the emerging in-
ternational standard outlawing hate speech, and Part V presents the 
contrasting story of American first amendment jurisprudence. Part VI 
suggests a doctrinal accommodation of these contrasting world views, 
recognizing the values of liberty and equality at the heart of both the 
American and the international position. This part suggests a narrow 
restriction of racist speech, mindful of first amendment values. Part 
VII applies this standard to hard cases, making tentative suggestions 
of appropriate outcomes. Part VIII calls for doctrinal change, and 
concludes that an absolutist first amendment response to hate speech 
has the effect of perpetuating racism: Tolerance of hate speech is not 
tolerance borne by the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax 
imposed on those least able to pay. 
IL OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE 
If we cannot understand this pain that women, that Indian women, that 
Black women, that Hawaiian women, that Chicano women go through, 
we are never going to understand anything. All the mega-theory will not 
get us anywhere because without that of understanding, mega-theory 
does not mean anything, does not reflect social reality, does not reflect 
people's experience. 
- Patricia Monture 14 
There is an outsider's jurisprudence15 growing and thriving along-
side mainstream jurisprudence in American law schools. The new 
feminist jurisprudence is a lively example ofthis. 16 A related, and less-
celebrated, outsider jurisprudence is that belonging to people of 
color. 17 
What is it that characterizes the new jurisprudence of people of 
14. Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, CLS, July 1988, at 25, 32 (News-
letter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies). 
15. This article uses "outsider" in order to avoid "minority" - a term that belies the numer-
ical significance of the constituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse. As with 
any attempt to classify a school of thought, this one oversimplifies and slights the nuances and 
diversity of a wide-ranging field. 
16. See, e.g., Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043 
(1987); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). 
17. Examples of jurisprudential writing explicitly considering the perspective of people of 
color include: D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, IOI HARV. L. 
REV. 1331 (1988); Delgado, supra note 6; Hall, The Constitution and Race: A Critical Perspec-
tive, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 229 (1988); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Scales-Trent, Black Women 
and the Constitution, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (Patricia J. 
Williams) [hereinafter Alchemical Notes]; Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary 
Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989) (Robert A. Williams, Jr.). 
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color? First is a methodology grounded in the particulars of their so-
cial reality and experience. This method is consciously both historical 
and revisionist, attempting to know history from the bottom. From 
the fear and namelessness of the slave, 18 from the broken treaties of 
the indigenous Americans, 19 the desire to know history from the bot-
tom has forced these scholars to sources often ignored: journals, 
poems, oral histories, and stories from their own experiences of life in 
a hierarchically arranged world. 20 
This methodology, which rejects presentist, androcentric, 
Eurocentric, and false-universalist descriptions of social phenomena, 
offers a unique description of law.21 The description is realist, but not 
necessarily nihilist. 22 It accepts the standard teaching of street wis-
dom: law is essentially political. 23 It accepts as well the pragmatic use 
of law as a tool of social change, and the aspirational core of law as the 
human dream of peaceable existence.24 If these views seem contradic-
tory, that is consistent with another component of jurisprudence of 
color: it is jurisprudence recognizing, struggling within, and utilizing 
contradiction, dualism, and ambiguity.25 
Dean Derrick Bell's book And We Are Not Saved 26 is an example 
of this. In a lyrical style Dean Bell describes a world infused with 
18. See Lawrence, A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L. REV. 627 
(1986). 
19. See V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 28-53 (1969). 
20. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV, 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 344-45 (1987) (discussing alternative sources). 
21. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, ls the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective 
on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981) (arguing for replacing the 
"reasonable man" standard used in analyzing criminal self-defense cases with a standard that 
recognizes the social reality of women and people of color). 
22. See Jones, Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429, 447-56 (1980), for an analy-
sis of the first amendment that attempts to create a doctrinal space for the antiracist outcomes 
the author advocates. 
23. The intuitive realism of outsiders is discussed in Matsuda, supra note 20, at 323. 
24. See, e.g .. Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minori-
ties Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 301 (1987) (arguing that while some aspects of the 
CLS approach to legal analysis are useful, its "advocacy of informality ... ignores the need for 
structure in containing and eliminating racism"); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Per-
ils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 103 (1987) 
(arguing that for people of color, critical legal theory must be used to transform current 
injustices). 
25. The theme of dualism is discussed, inter alia, in W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK 
FOLK (1961), and Stetson, Introduction to BLACK SISTER: POETRY BY BLACK WOMEN, 1746-
1980, at xviii (E. Stetson ed. 1981). See also Hall, Race and Constitution: Epilogue, N.Y.L. ScH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 425, 426 (1988) (A character in Hall's parable, a Mississippi grandma, says "I 
know firsthand the duality of law."). The duality of the Constitution has been analyzed by Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall. Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 How. L.J. 623 
(1987). 
26. D. BELL, supra note 17. 
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racism. This description ties law to racism, showing that law is both a 
product and a promoter of racism. Like the feminists who have shown 
that patriarchy has had its own march through history, related to but 
distinct from the march of class struggle, scholars of color have shown 
how racism is a separate, distinct, and central phenomenon in Ameri-
can life. 
The hopeful part of the description offered by theorists such as Bell 
is the occasional recognition of the vulnerability of racist structures. 
The few who have managed to subject the many to conditions of deg-
radation have used a variety of devices, from genocide to liberal 
doublespeak, that reveal the deep contradictions and instability inher-
ent in any organization of social life dependent upon subordination. 
The sorrow songs27 of the jurisprudence of color are thus tempered by 
an underlying descriptive message of the inevitability of humane social 
progress.28 
This progress can lead to a just world free of existing conditions of 
domination. The prescriptive message of outsider jurisprudence offers 
signposts to guide our way there: the focus on effects. 29 The need to 
attack the effects of racism and patriarchy in order to attack the deep, 
hidden, tangled roots characterizes outsider thinking about law. Out-
siders thus search for what Anne Scales has called the rachet30 - legal 
tools that have progressive effect, defying the habit of neutral princi-
ples to entrench existing power.31 They have derived rachet-like meas-
ures to eliminate effects of oppression, including affirmative action, 
reparations, desegregation, and the criminalization of racist and mis-
ogynist propaganda. Such measures are best implemented through 
formal rules, formal procedures and formal concepts of rights, for in-
formality and oppression are frequent fellow-travelers. 32 While cogni-
27. W.E.B. DuBois used African-American "sorrow songs" - an art form reflecting the 
"dark past" - as headnotes to his classic text, The Souls of Black Folk. See W.E.B. DuBOIS, 
supra note 25, at 181. 
28. One sees in the work of Frederick Douglass, for example, this messianic belief that the 
best will someday come. See w. MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 54 (1984). 
29. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 10, at 2128-30 (affirmative action and proof of discrimina-
tion; the effect and proof issue). 
30. Section on Jurisprudence, Am. Assn. of L. Schs. Newsl., Dec. 1987, at 5. 
31. See, e.g., Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes (Book Re-
view), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 770 (1989) ("[T]he legal system's insistence on symmetry, even 
between two asymmetrically positioned social groups, keeps the door open to additional incur-
sions of male viewpoint .... "). 
32. See Alchemical Notes, supra note 17, at 406-08; Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, 
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 
Wis. L. REV. 1359; cf. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 461-78 (1954) (discussing the 
effect of formal Jaws on personal attitudes). The use of stories, the theme of this symposium, is 
not necessarily a denouncement of structure in Jaw. As I see it, stories are a means of obtaining 
the knowledge we need to create just legal structure. 
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zant of the limits of law reform, outsider scholars have emphasized the 
instrumental uses of formal legal rules to achieve substantive justice. 
Using the descriptive and prescriptive messages of the emerging 
outsider jurisprudence to confront the problem of racist hate messages 
provides new insights into the longstanding neutral-principle33 di-
lemma of liberal jurisprudence. The following section will show how 
the victim's story illuminates particular values and suggests particular 
solutions to the problem of racist hate messages. 
III. RACIST HATE MESSAGES: THE VICTIM'S STORY 
The attempt to split bias from violence has been this society's most 
enduring rationalization. 
- Patricia Williams34 
A. Who Sees What: Some Initial Stories 
In writing this Article I am forced to ask why the world looks so 
different to me from how it looks to many of the civil libertarians 
whom I consider my allies. Classical thought labels ad hominem anal-
ysis a logical fallacy. 35 The identity of the person doing the analysis 
often seems to make the difference, however, in responding to racist 
speech. In advocating legal restriction of hate speech, I have found 
my most sympathetic audience in people who identify with target 
groups, while I have encountered incredulity, skepticism, and even 
hostility from others. 36 
33. The power of symmetry and neutrality claims is not lost on the Klan. In its efforts to 
exploit free speech claims it marches over the same routes as civil rights demonstrators. See, e.g., 
Handley v. City of Montgomery, 401 So. 2d 171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (Klan attempt to march 
without a permit from Selma to Montgomery). 
For exploration of the concepts of bias and neutrality, see Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Com-
ment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988), and Resnik, On the Bias: 
Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988). 
34. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's 
Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L. REV. 127, 139 (1987). 
35. See D. WALTON, ARGUER'S POSITION: A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF Ao HOMINEM AT· 
TACK, CRITICISM, REFUTATION, AND FALLACY 41-42 (1985). 
36. Law review articles suggesting limitation of hate speech are typically written by members 
of groups that have been victims of hate speech. See, e.g., Au, Freedom from Fear. 15 LINCOLN 
L. REV. 45 (1984) (arguing for a revival of Beauharnois in light of increases in anti-Asian vio-
lence and propaganda); Delgado, supra note 6; Jones, supra note 22 (advocating legal response to 
racist speech, and recounting his own harassment - including the words, "No Blacks Allowed 
Here" - while a student in Wisconsin); Kretzmer, Free Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 445 (1987). Feminist writers have also attempted to recognize the world view of victims of 
racism. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, supra note 21. 
In the several audiences I have addressed on this issue, women, Jews, and people of color 
have offered the most vocal statements of support. A notable counter example is the Jewish civil 
libertarians who have eloquently, and at great personal cost, argued for the free speech rights of 
Nazis and Klan members. This view, which sees the right of protest as essential for the protec· 
tion of minorities, leads these civil libertarians to defend their enemy. See A. NEIER, DEFEND· 
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This split in reaction is also evident in case studies of hate speech. 
The typical reaction of target-group members to an incident of racist 
propaganda is alarm and immediate calls for redress. 37 The typical 
reaction of non-target-group members is to consider the incidents iso-
lated pranks, the product of sick-but-harmless minds.38 This is in part 
a defensive reaction: a refusal to believe that real people, people just 
like us, are racists. 39 This disassociation leads logically to the claim 
that there is no institutional or state responsibility to respond to the 
incident. It is not the kind of real and pervasive threat that requires 
the state's power to quell.40 
Here are some true "just kidding" stories: 
An African-American worker found himself repeatedly subjected to ra-
cist speech when he came to work A noose was hanging one day in his 
work area. "KKK" references were directed at him, as well as other un-
fortunately typical racist slurs and death threats. His employer discour-
aged him from calling the police, attributing the incidents to 
"horseplay. " 41 
ING MY ENEMY (1979). While I disagree with this view, I admire the courage and conviction it 
reflects. 
37. Immediate redress is required because hate messages are rarely isolated. They usually 
arise in a setting where racial tensions exist, they tend to.spread and replicate, and the presence 
of one hate message tends to give rise to others. On the university campuses, for example, it is 
rare to hear of one incident only. Most of the reports cited in this Article, see infra note 71, 
noted numerous occurrences on the same campus. In the Skokie case, anonymous anti-Semitic 
phone calls plagued Jewish-surnamed residents of Skokie during the controversy over the Nazi 
demonstrators. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 681 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
38. THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS: A CHRONOLOGY OF RACIST AND FAR RIGHT VIO-
LENCE - 1980-1986, at 18 (C. Lutz comp. 1987) [hereinafter THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS] 
(compiling thousands of racist incidents and finding that "in the overwhelming majority of in-
stances, bigoted violence is simply ignored, dismissed as the work of young 'pranksters' or simply 
left unexplained"). But see CONNECTICUT ADVISORY COMMITIEE TO THE UNITED STATES 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HATE GROUPS AND ACTS OF BIGOTRY: CONNECTICUT'S RE-
SPONSE 60 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter HATE GROUPS] (eleven percent of state residents dismiss 
incidents as pranks). In response to NAACP and ADL testimony of firebombings and harass-
ment in Connecticut, one local police sergeant stated: "I believe these incidents are isolated and 
they are not necessarily racially motivated. I think perhaps the notoriety of other communities 
and the publicity the news media is giving these incidents is causing some of our younger people 
to act in that manner." Id. at 7. 
39. See Lawrence, supra note 17, at 321 (subconscious racism of ordinary people); cf R. 
LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986) (accounts of how seemingly ordinary professionals came to 
participate in Nazi atrocities). 
40. Cf Homant, Assessing Psychological Damages of Crime Victims, 25 TRIAL 86, 89 (1989) 
("Because most people find it comforting to believe in a 'just world,' the idea that life is fair and 
people get what they deserve, jurors may have a natural tendency to believe victim precipitation 
occurred."). 
41. See Citchen v. Firestone Steel Prods. Co., Nos. 12,190-EM & 15,389-EM (Mich. Civ. 
Rts. Commn. May 23, 1984), reported in 1984 MICHIGAN CJV. RTS. COMMISSION, CASE DIGEST 
13, 17-18. The Citchen case is treated extensively in Denis, Race Harassment Discrimination: A 
Problem That Won't Go Away?, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 415 (1984). The employee was sub-
jected to repeated hate messages including "Get out, n--r, you ain't wanted here,'' "N--r 
Ben, KKK," "KKK for you, Ben." Id. at 415. Taunts included notes in his shoe, welding his 
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In San Francisco, a swastika was placed near the desks of Asian-
American and African-American inspectors in the newly integrated fire 
department. The official explanation for the presence of the swastika at 
the fire department was that it was presented several years earlier as a 
'Joke" gift to the battalion chief, and that it was unclear why or how it 
ended up at the work stations of the minority employees. 42 
In Jackson, Mississippi, African-American employees of Frito-Lay 
found their cars sprayed with ''KKK" inscriptions, and were the targets of 
racist notes and threats. Local African Americans and Jews were con-
cerned, but officials said the problem was attributable to children. 43 
An African-American FBI agent was subject to a campaign of racist 
taunts by white co-workers. A picture of an ape was pasted over his child's 
photograph, and racial slurs were used. Such incidents were called 
"healthy" by his supervisor. 44 
In Seattle, a middle-management Japanese American was disturbed 
by his employer's new anti-Japanese campaign. As the employer's use of 
slurs and racist slogans in the workplace increased, so did the employee's 
discomfort. His objections were viewed as overly sensitive and uncoopera-
tive. He finally quit his job, and he was denied unemployment insurance 
benefits because his departure was "without cause. " 45 
In Contra Costa, California, Ku Klux Klan symbols were used to turn 
families looking for homes away from certain neighborhoods. The local 
sheriff said there was "nothing . . . to indicate this is Klan activity. " 46 
Similarly, a Hmong family in Eureka, California, was twice victim-
locker lock, a dead mouse, fishbones, and a kerosene-soaked cross in his locker. Repeated threats 
over a nine-year period resulted in a diagnosis of hypertension and depression. Id. at 434-35. 
The Civil Rights Commission eventually awarded the employee $1.5 million in damages. Id. at 
416. 
42. S.F. Fire Department Declared "Out of Control'~ Asian L. Caucus Rep., July-Dec. 1987, 
at 1, col 1. Edwin Lee of Chinese for Affirmative Action called the swastika incident "an act of 
racial violence, not to be taken lightly, but to be severely disciplined." Id. 
43. Poverty Law Report, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 11, col. 2. 
44. Black F.B.L Agent's Ordeal: Meanness That Never Let Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at 
1, col. 1. 
45. Complaint at 3, EEOC v. Hyster Co., Civ. No. 88-930-DA (D. Ore. filed Aug. IS, 1988) 
(alleging a hostile work environment created by racially objectionable advertisement campaign 
and use of racial slurs by management in work place). An Answer denying those allegations was 
filed by the defendant. See also Mr. M.K.O. v. Hyster Co., Charge No. 380,863,519, at 1-3 
(Wash. EEOC Dec. 15, 1987) (determination) (The EEOC found workplace references to "J-p 
competition,'' "the J-ps are coming," "slant-eye engines," "get those J-p engines out of 
there," "you can't trust those J-p bastards,'' and noted that the local and national Japanese-
American community found use of racial references in the company's ad - using samurai, 
kabuki, sumo figures associated with competitors - offensive. The employer's Director of 
Human Resources testified that the word "J-p" is not derogatory. He also stated that "W-p" 
- an epithet directed at Italians - is not derogatory.). 
Racist harassment of employees of Japanese ancestry is not uncommon. See Japanese Ameri-
can Library Bulletin, Winter 1989, at 4, col. 2 (noting EEOC action on behalf of Harumi 
Yoshimoto, targeted for "Remember Pearl Harbor" comments at a construction project). 
46. Racial Violence Belies Good Life in Contra Costa County, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, at 3, 
col. 5. 
August 1989] Racist Speech 2329 
ized by four-foot-high crosses burning on their lawn. Local police dis-
missed this as "a prank. " 47 
Why might anti-Japanese racial slurs mean something different to 
Asian and white managers?48 Here is a story of mine: 
As a young child I was told never to let anyone call me a J-p. 49 My 
parents, normally peaceable and indulgent folk, told me this in the tone 
reserved for dead-serious warnings. Don't accept rides from strangers. 
Don't play with matches. Don't let anyone call you that name. In their 
tone they transmitted a message of danger, that the word was a dangerous 
one, tied to violence. 
Just as I grew up to learn the facts about the unspoken danger my 
parents saw in the stranger in the car, I learned how they connected the 
violence of California lynch mobs and Hiroshima atom bombs to racist 
slurs against Japanese Americans. 
This early training in vigilance was reinforced by what I later learned 
about violence50 and Asian Americans: that people with features like 
mine are regular victims of violence tied to a wave of anti-Asian propa-
ganda that stretches from Boston51 to San Francisco, 52 from Galveston53 
to Detroit. 54 
47. AslAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER ADVISORY COMM., OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GEN., CAL. 
DEPT. OF JusrICE, FINAL REPORT 45 (1988) [hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. 
48. Being non-Asian is not necessarily an impediment to understanding the Asian experi-
ence. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 21, show this in the hypothetical used in their article on 
provocation (arguing for reduction in the degree of criminal charge for an Asian who commits a 
crime under provocation of racial slurs, considering life experience of Japanese-American de-
fendant, including World War II internment, racial harassment at work, and knowledge of preju-
dice against Japanese Americans). 
49. This Article does not spell out racial slurs in a personal effort to avoid harm to others, 
and to prevent desensitization to harmful words. As Audre Lorde has written: 
but I remember a promise 
I made with my pen 
never to leave it 
lying 
in somebody else's blood. 
A. LORDE, To the Poet Who Happens To Be Black and the Black Poet Who Happens To Be a 
Woman, in OUR DEAD BEHIND Us 7 (1986). 
50. Anti-Asian violence and harassment have grown considerably in recent years. See Cau-
cus Continues Anti-Asian Violence Work, Asian L. Caucus Rep., Aug. 1988, at 2, col. 4. 
51. See U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RECENT ACTIVITIES AGAINSf CITIZENS AND 
RESIDENTS OF As!AN DESCENT (Clearinghouse Pub. No. 88, 1986) [hereinafter RECENT ACTIV-
ITIES] (documenting hate speech and violence directed against Asians throughout the United 
States, including Boston). 
52. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47 (documenting numerous incidents of 
anti-Asian violence in California). 
53. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 
1001 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (intimidation of Vietnamese fishing families by paramilitary shows of 
force, threats - that it "may become necessary to take laws into our own hands" and "blood 
blood blood" - boat rides of armed, hooded Klansmen, firing cannons, hanging effigies, threat-
ening children and families of whites who dealt with Vietnamese, pointing weapons at 
Vietnamese, and threatening to burn boats at Galveston Bay, Texas). 
54. See RECENT ACTIVITIES, supra note 51, at 43-44 (concerning the murder of Vincent 
Chin). 
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The white managers who considered Mr. O. (the Japanese-Ameri-
can manager) an overly sensitive troublemaker, and the unemploy-
ment board that determined there was no good cause for him to quit 
his job, came from a different experience. They probably never heard 
of Vincent Chin. 55 They do not know about the Southeast-Asian-
American children spat upon and taunted as they walk home from 
school in Boston; about the vigilante patrols harassing Vietnamese 
shrimpers in Texas.56 Nor do they know that the violence in all these 
cases is preceded by propaganda similar to that used in Mr. O's work-
place: that those [racist slur for Asian groups] are taking over "our" 
country. 
Stories of anti-Asian violence are regularly reported in the Asian-
American press;57 just as stories of synagogue vandalism are regularly 
reported in the Jewish-American press;58 and anti-African-American 
violence, including the all-too-common phenomenon of "move-in" vi-
olence, 59 is regularly reported in the African-American press.60 Mem-
55. Vincent Chin was a 27-year-old Chinese American beaten to death by baseball-bat-wield-
ing thugs in Detroit. The assailants yelled, "It's because of you fucking J-ps that we're out of 
work!" The Vincent Chin case is a symbol to Asian Americans of the threat of racist violence. 
See CIVIL RIGHTS CAPACITY-BUILDING PROJECT, ASIAN AMERICAN RESOURCE WORKSHOP, 
To LIVE IN PEACE ... RESPONDING TO ANTI-AslAN VIOLENCE IN BOSTON 8 (1987). 
56. See id. at 9-16 (citing several murders, beatings, fire bombings and harassment of Asians 
in the greater Boston area, including spitting and pebble-throwing directed against Cambodian 
school children); Vietnamese Fishermen, 518 F. Supp. at 1001. 
57. See, e.g., Chin, Violence Against Asians, RICE, Feb. 1988, at 72; Compilation of Racial 
Attacks on [Asian] Indians, APAC Alert, Nov. 1988, at 1, col. 1 (newsletter of the Asian Pacific 
American Coalition, U.S.A); Dangerous Upsurge in Immigrant Scapegoating, CAAV Voice, Fall 
1988, at 3, col. 2 (newsletter of the Committeee Against Anti-Asian Violence); Caucus Continues 
Anti-Asian Violence Work, Asian L. Caucus Rep., Aug. 1988, at 2, col. 2. Anti-Asian violence is 
regularly reported in the Pacific Citizen, a weekly newspaper published by the Japanese Ameri-
can Citizens League. 
58. See, e.g., The Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles, for articles on hate crime, including 
Noonan, Locking Out Crime, Jewish J. of Greater L.A., Feb. 24-Mar. 2, 1989, at 5, col. l; Pfef-
ferman, Hate Crimes' Victims, id. at 5 (There are reports of vandalism every three weeks at 
Temple Beth Torah in Ventura - including graffiti, a dead pig carcass, break-ins, rocks thrown, 
shotgun blasts, and broken windows and doors. The President of the congregation reported "I'm 
not dealing with it well. I just feel so violated."); Carroll, Former Klansman's Election, id. at 6; 
Levin, Trouble on the Campus, id. at 7. See also SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER, RESPONSE, Aug. 
1988, at 6 (reporting synagogue arson). 
59. See, e.g., MICH. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HATE 
GROUPS IN MICHIGAN: A SHAM OR A SHAME 5-6 (1982) (reporting a black woman's loss of 
four fingers in a pipe-bomb explosion in her home in a predominantly white neighborhood in 
Detroit; "KKK," "White Power" and racial epithets spray-painted on a church after a black 
congregation moved into the facility located in a predominantly white neighborhood in Detroit); 
For the Record, Klanwatch Intelligence Report, May-June 1987, at 8, col. 1 (reporting numerous 
incidents of move-in harassment and violence); Now Is the Time: Outlaw the KKK, Nazis, and 
Other Hate Groups, The Organizer, June/July 1986, at 2, col. 1, at 7, col. 2 (newsletter of the 
National Alliance Against Racist & Political Repression ("NAARPR")) (The house of a black 
couple was firebombed the night they moved into a white neighborhood in suburban Louisville, 
Kentucky. Several members of the police force at the time of the incident were members of the 
KKK. The KKK had also invaded a meeting of the NAARPR in Louisville.). 
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bers of target-group communities tend to know that racial violence 
and harassment is widespread, common, and life-threatening; that 
"the youngsters who paint a swastika today may throw a bomb 
tomorrow."61 
The mainstream press often ignores these stories, giving rise to the 
view of racist and anti-Semitic incidents as random and isolated, and 
the corollary that isolated incidents are inconsequential. 62 For in-
formed members of these victim communities, however, it is logical to 
link together several thousand real life stories63 into one tale of 
caution.64 
B. The Structure of Racism 
While this Article focuses on the phenomenology of racism, it in-
cludes discussion of the closely related phenomenon of anti-Semitism. 
The same groups, using many of the same techniques, and operating 
from many of the same motivations and dysfunctions typically pro-
duce racist and anti-Semitic speech. The serious problems of violent 
pornography and anti-gay and anti-lesbian hate speech are not dis-
cussed in this Article. 65 While I believe these forms of hate speech 
60. See, e.g., The NAACP 1988 Convention Resolutions, THE CRISIS, Dec. 1988, at 27, 28 
(reporting NAACP convention resolution on racially motivated violence, citing incidents in 
Ohio, Indiana, Georgia, New York, Alabama, New Jersey, and at the University of Michigan 
and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst). 
61. GA. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PERCEPTIONS 
OF HATE GROUP ACTIVITY IN GEORGIA 3 (1982) [hereinafter HATE GROUP ACTIVITY] (testi-
mony of Stuart Lowengrub, Southeastern Regional Director, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith, Atlanta). 
At the University of Maryland, two-thirds of the white students had not heard of racist inci-
dents, while four-fifths of African-American students had. Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Ra-
cism 's Nuances, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, at l, col. 3, at 34, col. 4. 
62. For two constrasting views of how courts perceive these "isolated incidents," compare 
Blanco v. Hallmark Cards, 681 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1987) (occasional epithets do not create a 
hostile work environment), with Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing the abusive nature of epithets). 
63. See THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS, supra note 38 (3000 acts of bigoted violence re-
ported from 1980-1986). One study found that one out of four or five minority persons is victim-
ized by hate activity in the course of a year. Bigots' Crimes Called More Violent Than Perceived, 
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 28, 1989, at 3, col. 2 [hereinafter Bigots' Crimes] (reporting findings of the 
National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence). 
64. The Klan has admitted in court documents that its goal is to interfere with the exercise of 
civil rights, and that it accomplishes this by assaults, threats, and harassment against African 
Americans and against whites who support civil rights. This admitted purpose and method is 
what makes the word "KKK" and Klan symbolism so threatening to targets. See United States 
v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 337 (E.D. La. 1965) (reporting Klan 
admissions and explaining that they were made in order to prevent the taking of evidence from 
over 100 government witnesses on the goals and intimidation tactics of the Klan). 
65. See American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd., 
771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd. mem., 415 U.S. 1001 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional an 
attempt to ban pornography that subjugates women); Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, 
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require public restriction, these forms also require a separate analysis 
because of the complex and violent nature of gender subordination, 
and the different way in which sex operates as a locus of oppression. 66 
They are, therefore, beyond the scope of this piece. 
The claim that a legal response to racist speech is required stems 
from a recognition of the structural reality of racism in America. Ra-
cism, as used here, comprises the ideology of racial supremacy and the 
mechanisms for keeping selected victim groups in subordinated posi-
tions. 67 The implements of racism include:68 
1. Violence and genocide; 
2. Racial hate messages, disparagement, and threats; 
3. Overt disparate treatment; and 
4. Covert disparate treatment and sanitized racist comments. 
In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of the word. 69 
Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit 
the gut of those in the target group. The spoken message of hatred 
and inferiority is conveyed on the street, in schoolyards, in popular 
culture and in the propaganda of hate widely distributed in this coun-
try. 70 Our college campuses have seen an epidemic of racist incidents 
and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 
(1987). 
66. Violence and hate speech directed against women, gays, and lesbians, for example, are 
commonplace, socially accepted, and widely distributed across lines of race, class, and geogra-
phy. Pornography affects women through different mechanisms than does hate speech. Pornog-
raphy is the direct portrayal of sexual use and abuse of women, tied to the practice of actual 
violence. The visceral, "noncognitive," and violent nature of pornography is central to calls for 
its restraint. See, e.g., Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 
8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) {discussing, inter a/ia, pornographic portrayal of women being 
killed and mutilated, and the direct connection between pornography and violence); Sunstein, 
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589. 
67. For a review of definitions of racism, see W. SEDLACEK & G. BROOKS, RACISM IN 
AMERICAN EDUCATION: A MODEL FOR CHANGE 38 (1976). Racism includes conscious as well 
as unconscious acts of subordination; thus no claim of intentionality is made in this Article. See 
Lawrence, supra note 17. 
68. H. KITANO, RACE RELATIONS 121-29 (1974) {discussing stages of ethnic identity); H. 
SCHUMAN, c. STEEH & L. BOBO, RACIAL ATI'ITUDES IN AMERICA 193-212 {1985) (changing 
methods of expressing racist views). 
69. Cf Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (noting that the process of 
interpretation of legal language is ultimately bound to the imposition of violence). 
70. The rise in hate crimes by minors is sad testimony to the spread of the racist message. 
Uzelac, Punk-Rocking, Neo-Nazi 'Skinheads' Giving Boost to Hate Groups, Atlanta J, & Const., 
Jan. 2, 1989, at A2, col. 6 (Seventy children gathered at a Mississippi training camp in December 
1988 for white supremacist political education and military drills. For target practice they re-
portedly shot at images of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). In Davis, California, Thong Hy Huynh, 
a Vietnamese-American high school student was stabbed to death after months of racial taunts. 
A memorial marking his death was spray-painted with swastikas and "Death to G-ks." AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47, at 44. 
The influence of hate propaganda on psychopathic killers also reveals the widespread availa-
bility of the culture of hate. See ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47, at 44 {pregnant 
Chinese immigrant pushed in front of oncoming subway train by man who feared Asians); A Law 
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in the 1980s.71 The hate speech flaring up in our midst includes insult-
ing nouns for racial groups, degrading caricatures, threats of violence, 
and literature portraying Jews and people of color as animal-like and 
requiring extermination. 72 
for Racist Killers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1981, at 80 (schizophrenic killer thought African Amer-
icans were "like animals, to be eaten."); Social Worker Relates Stockton Tragedy to JACL Na-
tional Board, Pacific Citizen, Feb. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (mass murder of Southeast Asian-
American school children by deranged killer with possible racial motivation). 
71. See THEY DoN'T ALL WEAR SHEETS, supra note 38, at 12 (noting increase of racist 
incidents on college campuses); Lord, Greek Rites of Exclusion, 245 NATION, 10 (1987) at 10 
(At the University of Michigan: racist leaflets in dorms, verbal abuse of African-American stu-
dents, white students painting themselves black and placing rings in their noses at ·~ungle par-
ties"); White, The New Racists, Ms., Oct. 1987 at 68 (reporting racist incidents at the University 
of Michigan, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Wisconsin, the Uni-
versity of New Mexico, Columbia, Wellesley, Duke, and UCLA); Wilkerson, supra note 61 (re-
porting fliers urging lynchings, epithets, stone-throwing, swastikas, and anti-Asian graffiti, at 
several American universities); Cohen, White Supremacists Find Recruits on Campus, Klanwatch 
Intelligence Report, Feb. 1988, at 15, col. 1 (flyers stating "The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan are 
watching you" distributed at Northwest Missouri State University; KKK members speaking at 
Kansas University; White Student Union formed at Temple University; White Student Union 
flyers at University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; Aryan Resistance literature at Stanford; Invisible 
Empire literature at Stockton State College, New Jersey; bomb threats at Memphis State Univer-
sity Jewish Student Union; bullet fired at Hillel Foundation Building at Arizona State Univer-
sity); Roses and Thorns, Perspectives (American Historical Association Newsletter), Sept. 1987, 
at 23 (statement of historians attending the Fifth Citadel Conference on the South, expressing 
"concern over continued racial incidents upon the nation's campuses" and noting intimidation of 
African-American students at Harvard, Rutgers, Purdue, Columbia, the Citadel, and the Univer-
sities of Massachusetts at Amherst, Michigan, and Wisconsin); see also Wiener, Reagan's Chil-
dren, Racial Hatred on Campus, 248 NATION, 260 (1989) (Racist statements and incidents at the 
University of Michigan, Dartmouth, Wisconsin, UCLA, Purdue, Montclair State College, New 
Jersey were reported. At Michigan, a campus radio announcer referred to African hair as "pu-
bic" hair. At Dartmouth, a professor was called "a cross between a welfare queen and a bath-
room attendant," and the Dartmouth Review purported to quote a black student, "Dese boys be 
sayin' that we be comin' here to Dartmut an' not takin' the classics. You know, Homa .... " At 
Wisconsin, a fraternity held a mock "slave auction" and other fraternities held black-face "Har-
lem parties," and used anti-Semitic remarks. At Purdue, a· counselor found "Death N--r" 
scratched on her door); Racist Caricatures Anger Students, supra note 2; Cal Poly Pomona Stu-
dents Protest Anti-Asian Attacks, Pacific Citizen, Mar. 17, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (students protest 
racist incidents including attack on a Japanese-American woman); Harvard Law Record, Jan. 
20, 1989, at 8, col. 1 (burning and ripping of Jesse Jackson poster, swastika in elevator, defacing 
of women of color poster, placing a laundry ticket on Asian students poster, reported at NYU 
Law School); Harris, Hindman's "Nega" Example Reveals Problem, Cavalier Daily (University 
of Virgina), Nov. 10, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (A student's comments on the events surrounding, and 
following, an incident involving Phi Gamma Delta fraternity party fliers using words "No ... 
short w-ps and please no nega babes." Fraternity members reported these were inside jokes 
intended to insult women and were not of a racial nature. Several weeks later, the student found 
a sign repeating the slur. The sign had been posted by a vice chairman of the Honor Commit-
tee.); Klanwatch Intelligence Report, Feb. 1988, at 13, col. 1 ("KKK" carved on dormitory 
room door of two African-American women students at Chapel Hill, North Carolina); id. at 18, 
col. 2 (Social Nationalist Aryan People's Party literature distributed at Mills College; anti-Se-
mitic flyers at Stanford prior to the 50th anniversary of Kristallnacht); Professor Fasts to Right 
Violence Against Asians, Pacific Citizen, Sept. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Asian-American students at 
the University of Connecticut at Storrs were harassed and spat upon. A Chinese-American pro-
fessor began a hunger strike in protest.). 
72. For a case involving victims of such speech, see, e.g., Cummings v. Adkins, No. 79-2-
02278-0 (Yakima, Wash., County Super. Ct. Aug 10, 1981), described in 25 ATLA L. Rep. 66 
(1982) (employee subject to racial slurs at work). For a horror story of racial harassment in the 
workplace, see Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981) (African-American Ar-
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While violence and hate propaganda are officially renounced by 
elites,73 other forms of racism are not.74 Jim Crow, which persists 
today in the form of private clubs and de facto segregated schools and 
neighborhoods, is seen as less offensive than cross burnings. Covert 
disparate treatment and sanitized racist comments are commonplace 
and socially acceptable in many settings. 75 The various implements of 
racism find their way into the hands of different dominant-group 
members. Lower- and middle-class white men might use violence 
against people of color, while upper-class whites might resort to pri-
vate clubs or righteous indignation against "diversity" and "reverse 
discrimination."76 Institutions - government bodies, schools, corpo-
rations - also perpetuate racism through a variety of overt and covert 
means.77 
kansas National Guard employees subjected to racist language and jokes, physical threats, being 
called "boy," a noose hanging in a supply room, the office mail cart used to spread hate messages 
including "the only good n--r is a dead n--r," and other obscene defamation so extreme it 
is not included in this footnote). See also Chicago v. Lambert, 47 Ill. App. 2d 151, 197 N.E. 2d 
448 (1964) (prosecution for hate speech degrading Jews and African Americans- hate literature 
reprinted with opinion). 
73. This official line masks the commonality of elite participation in racist violence. See H. 
SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOM· 
ERY (1988). Shapiro notes the history of white elite participation in and support for violence 
against African Americans, and notes that, given the historical prevalence of violence generated 
by white racism, "it is one of the ironies of contemporary experience that many Americans have 
been conditioned to associate violence with the behavior of black people." Id. at xi. 
74. Adrienne Rich recalls the social conduct of upper-class southern whites that expressed 
racism in polite language, such as the expression, "That's white of you." A. RICH, BLOOD, 
BREAD, AND POETRY 103, 106 n.2 (1986). 
75. I have heard many anti-African-American, anti-Latino, and anti-Semitic comments by 
people who assume that Asian Americans are not offended by such speech. I have heard these 
comments in law firms, at universities, and at fancy dinner parties, as well as in working-class 
settings. In my efforts of private reprimand for racist speech, I have found upper-class speakers 
more likely to defend their racism. When I objected to the statement that members of an ethnic 
group are welfare cheaters, the wealthy woman who made the statement proceeded to provide 
"evidence" that she was correct. When I objected to an L.A. cabdriver's similar statement, he 
responded, "Lady, I grew up among garbage and garbage comes out of my mouth,'' and he 
apologized for offending me. 
76. See H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH & L. Boso, supra note 68, at 202-05 (showing longitudinal 
changes in American public opinion favoring equality but resisting remedial steps to implement 
equality); Kinder, The Continuing American Dilemma: White Resistance to Racial Change 40 
Years After Mydral, 42 J. Soc. IssuES 151 (1986) (Symbolic racism blends values of individual-
ism and self-reliance with racism. This modem form is evidenced in opposition to busing, affirm· 
ative action, and African-American candidates for office, and agreement with statements that 
African Americans are demanding too much.); Sears, Hensler & Speer, Whites' Opposition to 
"Busing'~· Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 369 (1979) (discussing 
"symbolic racism" and the ways in which deep seated fears are converted into opposition to 
busing or affirmative action); see also Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 
1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 687-92 (1985) (identifying features of modem preju-
dice, including: (I) rejection of gross stereotypes, (2) compliance without internalization of racial 
acceptance, (3) emotional ambivalence, (4) micro-aggressions - use of nonracial objections to 
racial change, (5) sense of subjective threat, (6) individualistic conceptions of opportunity). 
77. See W. SEDLACEK & G. BROOKS, supra note 68, at 5-7 (discussing "How Racism Oper-
ates"). Government officials are frequently caught using racist slurs. See, e.g., T. BELL, THE 
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From the victim's perspective, all of these implements inflict 
wounds, wounds that are neither random nor isolated. Gutter racism, 
parlor racism, corporate racism, and government racism work in coor-
dination, reinforcing existing conditions of domination. Less egre-
gious forms of racism degenerate easily into more serious forms. 
The Japanese-American executive who resigns in protest when his 
employer starts publishing anti-Japanese slogans to improve sales 
knows that there is a connection between racist words and racist 
deeds. The racially motivated beating death of Vincent Chin by unem-
ployed white auto workers in Detroit, during a time of widespread 
anti-Asian propaganda in the auto industry, was no accident.78 Nor 
was the murder of the Davis, California, high school student Thong 
Hy Huynh, after months of anti-Asian racial slurs.79 
Violence is a necessary and inevitable part of the structure of ra-
cism. 80 It is the final solution, as fascists know, barely held at bay 
while the tactical weapons of segregation, disparagement, and hate 
propaganda do their work. The historical connection of all the tools 
of racism is a record against which to consider a legal response to 
racist speech. 
C. The Specific Negative Effects of Racist Hate Messages 
everywhere the crosses are burning, 
sharp-shooting goose-steppers around every corner, 
there are snipers in the schools . . . 
(I know you don't believe this. 
You think this is nothing 
but faddish exaggeration. But they 
are not shooting at you.) 
Lorna Dee Cervantes81 
THIRTEENTH MAN: A REAGAN CABINET MEMOIR 104 (1987) (Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
referred to as a "c-n"; Arabs referred to as "sand n--rs" by members of the Reagan White 
House staff). 
78. See THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS, supra note 38, at 17 ("There are no areas of the 
country where white supremacist organizations have been extremely active without correspond-
ingly high levels of bigoted violence."). Anti-Asian racist slurs used by auto-industry and trade 
executives are documented in Asia Bashing: Bias Against Orientals Increases with Rivalry of Na-
tions' Economics, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1986, at l, col. 1. For a history of attacks on Asian 
Americans during times of perceived threat from "foreigners," see ATIORNEY GENERAL'S RE-
PORT, supra note 47, at 33-39. 
79. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47, at 44. 
80. A dramatic increase in racist violence and murder occurred in the late 1980s, particularly 
associated with the skinheads. See Reports of Racial Violence on the Rise, Klanwatch Intelli-
gence Report, Feb. 1989, at 9, col. 1; see also Los ANGELES COUNTY COMMN. ON HUMAN 
RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los ANGELES COUNTY 1988, at 1 (1989) [hereinafter HATE 
CRIME IN L.A.] (reporting escalation of hate crimes beginning in 1986 and 1987, continuing 
through 1988, after a period of decline in the mid-1980s). 
81. Cervantes, Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me Howl An Intelligent Well-
2336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2320 
Racist hate messages are rapidly increasing and are widely distrib-
uted in this country using a variety of low and high technologies. 82 
The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for the 
victims. 83 Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physi-
ological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, 
rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide. 84 Professor Pa-
Read Person Could Believe in the War Between Races, in M. SANCHEZ, CONTEMPORARY CHI· 
CANA POETRY 90 (1986). 
82. For a history of hate group activity, see SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, THE Ku 
KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE (Jd ed. 1988) (noting history and recent 
rise of KKK, and growing coalition of violent right-wing hate groups in the United States, in· 
cluding neo-Nazis, survivalists, skinheads, and the KKK). Hate messages are spread through 
anonymous phone calls and letters, posters, books, magazines and pamphlets, cable television, 
recorded phone messages, computer networks, bulk mail, graffiti, and leaftetting. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, SPECIAL EDITION: ELEC· 
TRONIC HATE (1987) (report on use of cable television public access by hate groups); CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, "SHAVED FOR BATTLE": 
SKINHEADS TARGET AMERICA'S YOUTH (1987) (use of music and youth culture to spread white 
supremacist ideology and violence); Chin, supra note 57, at 72 (White Aryan Resistance tele· 
phone message blaming high insurance rates on Asians and Latinos); Dent, Et Al, STUDENT 
LAW., Dec. 1984, at 46 (recorded message using the word "n--r" 9 times in 75 seconds); 
.Jones, Violence by Skinheads Spreads Across Nation, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 3 
'(reporting 2000-3500 members of violent racist groups using bulk mail, computers, television, 
and leafleting of schools - particularly in the northwest - to attract growing numbers of new 
members). 
More recent cases show little change in racists' style. See, e.g., License Issue Goes Away, N.Y. 
·Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at 10, col. 1 (reporting sale of KTTL-FM of Dodge City, Kansas, which 
:had urged listeners to "mak[e] dossiers, names, addresses, phone numbers, car license numbers" 
on all rabbis, in order to "set up ambushes"). 
83. See, e.g., Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1988) (Afri· 
1can-American sheriff's deputy suffered emotional distress and humiliation from racial discrimi· 
.nation at work); Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986) (African-American 
1,welder suffered several years of racial harassment and employment discrimination resulting in 
'severe health complications). The harm of racist insult is discussed extensively in Delgado, supra 
note 6. Delgado cites classic psychological evidence of the destruction of self-worth by racist 
attitudes. 
84. Effects of racial prejudice include displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, withdrawal, 
alcoholism, and suicide. H. KITANO, supra note 68, at 113; see also G. ALLPORT, supra note 32, 
at 141-61 (psychological responses to racist victimization include withdrawal, clowning, 
·*engthening in-group ties, self-hate, militancy, status-striving, and the self-fulfilling prophecy); 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47, at 45 (racial epithets and harassment "often 
cause deep emotional scarring, and bring feelings of intimidation and fear that pervade every 
' aspect of a victim's life"); Delgado, supra note 6 (noting, inter alia, high blood pressure, loss of 
self-worth, and special harm to children); cf. Denis, supra note 41, at 415 (discussing damages for 
psychic injury in race harassment cases); Hafner, Psychological Disturbances Following Prolonged 
· Persecution, Soc. PSYCHIATRY, July 1968, at 79 (discussing psychological symptoms including 
headaches, dizziness, social withdrawal, chronic depression, and anxiety neurosis in survivors of 
extreme persecution). The unprovoked and unpredictable nature of bigoted attacks adds to the 
anxiety they create. African Americans have been subjected to racist attacks while engaging in 
commonplace activities such as changing a tire or attending a church picnic. See HATE GROUPS, 
supra note 38, at 5. Victims have had some limited success in proving emotional distress and 
psychological damage from racist messages. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 
672 F. Supp. 1408 (M.D. Fla. 1987), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir., 1989) 
(woman subjected to repeated racial harassment, including nooses hanging over her desk, suf-
fered nervous breakdown). 
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tricia Williams has called the blow of racist messages "spirit murder" 
in recognition of the psychic destruction victims experience. 85 
Victims are restricted in their personal freedom. In order to avoid 
receiving hate messages, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo educa-
tion, leave their homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own 
exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and de-
meanor. 86 The recipient of hate messages struggles with inner turmoil. 
One subconscious response is to reject one's own identity as a victim-
group member. 87 As writers portraying the African-American experi-
ence have noted, the price of disassociating from one's own race is 
often sanity itself. 88 
As much as one may try to resist a piece of hate propaganda, the 
effect on one's self-esteem and sense of personal security is devastat-
85. Williams, supra note 34, at 129. 
86. See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (African-American 
employee fired after hospital receives racist bomb threats for hiring African Americans); Sambos 
Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 703 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., dissenting) 
(African Americans tend to avoid public facilities with racially offensive names); HATE GROUP 
ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 20 (discussing case of a fourteen-year-old boy who was the subject of 
Klan leafleting campaign and became so frightened he dropped out of school); id. at 23 (citing 
testimony of State Representative and civil rights leader, Hosea Williams, to the effect that he has 
become leery of civil rights marches because after outsiders leave, local whites harass local Afri-
can Americans). 
See also Letter from Bobby Person (July 3, 1986) (distributed by the Southern Poverty Law 
Center) (prison guard, the first African American to attain the rank of sergeant, was harassed 
with a cross burning and KKK visits); Denis, supra note 41 (citing several cases of race harass-
ment in the workplace); Dent, supra note 82, at 48 (African-American Naval Reserve ensign 
resigns from officers' school after threats from "Navy KKK"). At the other end of the spectrum, 
racial stereotyping carries daily modification of behavior and dress to counteract stereotypes. See 
Lieberson, Stereotypes: Their Consequences for Race and Ethnic Interaction, in RESEARCH ON 
RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 113 (C. Marrett & C. Leggon eds. 1985). 
Professor Judith Weightman has told me that, in conducting interviews with Japanese-Amer-
ican World War II veterans, she noted denial of discrimination that, upon questioning, turned to 
an admission that informants simply avoided places, organizations, and events that perpetuated 
anti-Japanese exclusion and thus could report "not experiencing" discrimination. See also H. 
KITANO, supra note 68, at 113-14 (discussing ways in which ethnics avoid situations where they 
will encounter prejudice). 
87. When this writer confronted a cityful of anti-Asian posters, a strange process of disasso-
ciation occurred. "Not me, they must mean those immigrants." One researcher of racially moti-
vated crime noted that "victims will deny it's a hate crime. If you feel you're a victim because of 
your religion or your color, then each time you step out the door [you fear] you're going to be 
attacked." Professor Jack McDevitt, Center for Applied Social Research at Northeastern Uni-
versity, quoted in Bigots' Crimes, supra note 63. See also H. KITANO, supra note 68, at 113-14 
(discussing the "passing" syndrome). 
88. See Baldwin, African Self-Consciousness and the Mental Health of African-Americans, 15 
J. BLACK STUDIES 177 (1984) ("Alien self" in African Americans comes from identifying with 
Europeans); cf. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 10, 67-68 (discussing tendency of outsider groups to "internalize the views" of 
the dominant group); Cervantes, supra note 81 ("Let me show you my wounds: my stumbling 
mind, my 'excuse me' tongue, and this nagging preoccupation with the feeling of not being good 
enough."). See generally W. GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968). 
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ing. 89 To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all 
human beings. However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right 
at the emotional place where we feel the most pain. The aloneness 
comes not only from the hate message itself, but also from the govern-
ment response of tolerance. When hundreds of police officers are 
called out to protect racist marchers,90 when the courts refuse redress 
for racial insult, and when racist attacks are officially dismissed as 
pranks, the victim becomes a stateless person. Target-group members 
can either identify with a community that promotes racist speech, or 
they can admit that the community does not include them. 
The effect on non-target-group members is also of constitutional 
dimension. Associational and other liberty interests of whites are cur-
tailed by an atmosphere rife with racial hatred.91 In addition, the pro-
cess of dissociation can affect their mental health. Dominant-group 
members who rightfully, and often angrily, object to hate propaganda 
share a guilty secret: their relief that they are not themselves the tar-
get of the racist attack. While they reject the Ku Klux Klan, they may 
feel ambivalent relief that they are not African-American, Asian, or 
89. As one student reported after watching harassment of an African-American professor at 
Dartmouth, "That moment let me know that there are people in this world who hate you just 
because of your color. Not dislike you, or choose not to be friends with you, but hate you." 
Wiener, supra note 71, at 260. Any practicing psychotherapist knows of adults forever scarred 
by an early message of "you're not good enough," which creates lifelong feelings of inadequacy 
and inability to experience inner joy at one's achievements and abilities. I thank my student 
Terry Wade, a psychotherapist, for this insight. 
90. See 6 Protesters Arrested at Houston Klan March, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, at 23, col. I 
(six hundred police in riot gear protected Ku Klux Klan marchers in Houston). 
91. Hate messages, threats, and violence against whites is often the price of hiring, marrying, 
adopting, socializing with, and even jogging with, people of color. See EEOC v. St. Anne's 
Hospital, 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (bomb threat for hiring an African American); Guillory v. 
Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955) (white woman suffers nervous breakdown 
after hiring a black cook to work in her restaurant, as a result of constant racist harassment from 
neighbors); HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 19 (Gene Guerrero, Executive Director, 
ACLU of Georgia, testified of repeated harassment of a white woman recreation director who 
supervised integrated children. After cross burnings and KKK letters directed at her, she de· 
cided to flee to another state.); THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS, supra note 38, at 13; YOUNG 
AND VIOLENT, supra note 5, at 11 (reporting skinhead murder of white musician who brought an 
African American to a party in Santa Clara, California); Dent, supra note 82, at 48 (Estacada, 
Oregon home of interracial couple vandalized with KKK graffiti); 5 Youths Charged After Store 
Melee Under New Ethnic Intimidation Law, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 26, 1989, at 4A, col. 3 
(skinheads harass and attack white man walking with three African Americans); see also United 
States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 339 (E.D. La. 1965) (Klan 
rules require boycott of whites who, inter a/ia, "serve[] Negroes and whites on an integrated 
basis" or "allow[] Negroes to use White rest rooms" and adding that a Klan member who 
patronizes boycotted whites "shall be wrecked by the wrecking crew who shall be appointed by 
the Committee."). Judge Wisdom's opinion chronicled instances of the Klan interfering with the 
exercise of civil rights and first amendment rights in Bogalusa, Louisiana, including notices that 
"we have KLAN members in every conceivable business . . . . [W]e take this means to urge all of 
you to refrain from attending this meeting. Those who do attend [are] integrationists and will be 
dealt with accordingly .... " 250 F. Supp. at 343. 
August 1989] Racist Speech 2339 
Jewish. Thus they are drawn into unwilling complacency with the 
Klan, spared from being the feared and degraded thing. 
Just as when we confront human tragedy - a natural disaster, a 
plane crash - we feel the blessing of the fortunate that distances us 
from the victims, the presence of racist hate propaganda distances 
right-thinking dominant-group members from the victims, making it 
harder to achieve a sense of common humanity. Similarly, racist 
propaganda forces victim-group members to view all dominant-group 
members with suspicion. 92 It forces well-meaning dominant-group 
members to use kid-glove care in dealing with outsiders. 93 This is one 
reason why social relations across racial lines are so rare in America. 
Research in psychosocial94 and psycholinguistic95 analysis of ra-
cism suggests a related effect of racist hate propaganda: at some level, 
no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group 
members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea 
that may hold some truth. 96 The idea is improbable and abhorrent, 
but it is there before us, because it is presented repeatedly. "Those 
people" are lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscru-
92. As one student wrote in the midst of controversy over a racist poster at the University of 
Virginia, "How can I, the Average White Student, communicate to the 'black community' that I 
am not racist?" The student went on to argue that "bigotry" and "racism" are as insulting as 
racial epithets and to decry "hostility and suspicion." Whether the student's analysis is correct, 
it carried a tone of genuine frustration at the lack of collegial relations between African Ameri-
can and white students during the poster controversy. Letter to the Editor, University Journal 
(University of Virginia), Nov. 4, 1988, at 4, col. 2. As one sensitive student wrote to me, his 
WASP-ness subjects him to "double ostracism - from whites who cannot stand my [anti-racist] 
attitude and outsiders who look at my skin and distrust." 
93. Cj Brislin, Prejudice and Intergroup Communication, in INTERGROUP COMMUNICATION 
74, 74 (W. Gudykunst ed. 1986) (white anxiety stemming from conscious desire to overcome 
history of prejudice in society "can be interpreted as coldness or lack of spontaneity"); Weitz, 
Attitude, Voice, and Behavior: A Repressed Affect Model of Interracial Interaction, 24 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 14, 20 (1972) (whites treated African Americans with "verbal over-
friendliness, coupled with vocal and behavioral cues of affective retreat"). 
94. For discussion of the psychology of negative associations with blackness, see W. JORDAN, 
WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); J. 
KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHl5rORY (1970); Frank & Gilovich, The Dark Side of Se/f-
and Social Perceptions: Black Uniforms and Aggression in Professional Sports, 54 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 74 (1988) (more penalties assessed to teams in black uniforms). 
95. The field of psycholinguistics studies the relationship between language and human be-
havior, exploring the ways in which the words we hear and speak can affect our behavior. See L. 
Fergenson, Group Defamation, From Language to Thought and Action (unpublished paper 
presented at the Hofstra University Conference on Group Defamation & Freedom of Speech, 
Apr. 21, 1988) citing, inter a/ia, H. CLARK & E. CLARK, PSYCHOLOGY AND LANGUAGE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLINGUl5rlCS (1977). See also Media Violence and Antisocial Behav-
ior, J. Soc. IssuES, No. 3, 1986, at 1 (L.R. Huesmann & N. Malamuth eds.). 
96. Psychological study of cueing behavior indicates that overhearing a racist slur causes the 
listener to evaluate members of the slurred group more harshly in the future. Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic Slur on Evaluations of the Target: How to Spread 
a Social Disease, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 61, 70 (1985). 
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table, we are told.97 We reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to 
one of "those people" the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered. 98 
We stifle it, reject it as wrong, but it is there, interfering with our per-
ception and interaction with the person next to us.99 For the victim, 
similarly, the angry rejection of the message of inferiority is coupled 
with absorption of the message. When a dominant-group member re-
sponds favorably, there is a moment of relief - the victims of hate 
messages do not always believe in their insides that they deserve de-
cent treatment. This obsequious moment is degrading and dispiriting 
when the self-aware victim acknowledges it. 100 
Psychologists and sociologists have done much to document the 
effects of racist messages on both victims and dominant-group mem-
bers.101 Writers of color have given us graphic portrayals of what life 
is like for victims of racist propaganda. 102 From the victim's perspec-
tive103 racist hate messages cause real damage. 104 
97. See, e.g., Steplan & Rosenfield, Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes, in IN THE EYE OF THE 
BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN STEREOTYPING 92 (A. Miller ed. 1982) (persistence of 
negative stereotyping of African Americans). 
98. Cf. Gardner & Taylor, Ethnic Stereotypes: Their Effects on Person Perception, 22 CANA-
DIAN J. PSYCHOLOGY 267 (1968); Lobel, Effects of Personal Versus Impersonal Rates Instructions 
on Relative Favorability of Thirteen Ethnic Group Stereotypes, 128 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 29 (1987) 
(citing various studies of prejudice and stereotyping). 
99. Another story: In conducting research for this Article, I read an unhealthy number of 
racist statements. A few weeks after reading about a "dotbusters" campaign against immigrants 
from India, I passed by an Indian woman on my campus. Instead of thinking, "What a beautiful 
sari," the first thought that came into my mind was "dotbusters." Only after setting aside the 
hate message could I move on to my own thoughts. The propaganda I read had taken me one 
step back from casually treating a fellow brown-skinned human being as that, rather than as 
someone distanced from myself. (Numerous incidents of racially motivated violence and hate 
speech against Asian Indians have occurred in recent years. See APAC Alert, supra note 57.) 
100. Professor Patricia Williams does us a service in addressing this phenomenon in her 
courageous writing for this symposium. See Williams, supra note 10. 
101. See G. ALLPORT, supra note 32; H. KITANO, supra note 68, at 113-14 (discussing ef-
fects of prejudice); H. SCHUMAN, C. STEEH & L. Boao, supra note 68, at 123, 137 (negative 
responses to Ku Klux Klan declining in public opinion). In addition to harm to victims, racist 
speech in a way harms the speaker, by causing the speaker's isolation and escalating racism. See 
Abelson, Beliefs Are Like Possessions, 16 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 227, 228 (1986) (insults cause 
arguers to become more extreme in their positions). As we learn more about the compulsive/ 
psychosocial aspects of racism, we may come to see how allowing the racist speaker to fall into 
an accelerating upward spiral of racist behavior is akin to letting a disease go untreated. The 
paternalistic ring of the disease model causes dis-ease given our knowledge of the harm done 
under that model to innocent nonconformists, the weak, the poor, women, and children. On the 
other hand, extreme libertarian individualism denies the racists the opportunity to know what 
life might be like if their escalating racism were to be restrained. This possibility is particularly 
poignant considering the young children socialized into racism in ·~unior klan" organizations. 
See supra note 71. 
102. See, e.g., AFRO-AMERICAN WRITING (R. Long & E. Collier eds. 1985). 
103. Alan Freeman recognized the value of victim perspective in his article, Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). 
104. David Matas, National Chair of the League of Human Rights of B'nai B'rith, Canada, 
noted in the Canadian context that the World War II internment of Japanese Canadians, and the 
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If the harm of racist hate messages is significant, and the truth 
value marginal, the doctrinal space for regulation of such speech is a 
possibility. An emerging international standard seizes this possibility. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS-EMERGING 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE VICTIM'S STORY 
The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate 
propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: 
Article 4 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which 
are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per-
sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro-
mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to 
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite-
ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard 
to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, 
inter alia: 
(a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi-
nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against 
any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also 
the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof; 
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ-
ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or 
activities as an offence punishable by law; [and] 
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national 
or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination. 105 
Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate 
messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or 
hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. 
The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the 
need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including 
the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. 
Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding 
turning away of Jewish Holocaust refugees in Canada, was a concrete harm resulting from hate 
propaganda. D. Matas, Should Zundel Have Been Prosecuted?, Remarks Prepared for a Seminar 
in Halifax 3.4 (Mar. 22, 1985) (on file with author). 
105. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Racial Discrimination 
Convention]. 
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that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm-
ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An 
American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read 
article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio-
lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro-
hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position 
was voiced continually in the debates106 preceding adoption of the 
Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and 
troublesome. 107 
To those who struggled through early international attempts108 to 
deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur-
gency.109 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear 
in their minds. 110 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six 
million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major 
theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are 
complex, 111 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the 
rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the 
emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. 
In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti-
semitic incidents in several parts of the world."112 The movement to 
implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and 
of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states 
sought effective means of eliminating discrimination.113 
106. See N. LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 43-53 (2d ed. 1980). 
107. See id. at 53. 
108. The article is the result of many attempted rewordings and compromises, going back to 
the first attempts at formation of an international bill of rights. In 1949, the Commission on 
Human Rights, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, proposed a draft International Covenant on 
Human Rights. The draft was an early attempt to concretize the "lofty principles" of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. The draft enumerated several specific rights, and imposed 
obligations of implementation upon member states. Between article 20, governing equal protec-
tion before the law, and article 22, avoiding construction of the covenant that would destroy 
rights protected therein, is a noticeable gap. There is no article 21. Instead, the Commission left 
a notation that it had postponed discussion of article 21, which, in a version proposed by France, 
refers to incitement to violence through "advocacy of national, racial, or religious hostility." 
Text of Draft International Covenant on Human Rights As Submitted to Member Governments for 
Consideratio11 and Commellt, 1949 Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 332, 336, U.N. Sales No. 1951.XIV.1. 
The problem of racist speech, it seems, was not one the Commission was ready to deal with in 
1949. 
109. The Italian representative, for example, spoke of the millions of victims of racial hatred 
"in our generation." N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 10. 
110. In 1963, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination in response to "outbursts of swastica painting around the world 
in 1959-60." R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (1979). 
111. See generally F. CARSTEN, THE RISE OF FASCISM (1967). 
112. N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 1. 
113. The movement for implementation first focused upon a General Assembly Declaration 
August 1989] Racist Speech 2343 
While there was consensus on the basic goal of elimination of dis-
crimination, there was division on the question of incitement to ha-
tred. The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities began work in 1964, using drafts prepared by 
the representatives of the United States, by the United Kingdom, and 
a joint draft by the representatives of the USSR and Poland. 114 Thus 
the Sub-Commission had the benefit of vastly different ideological 
views as well as a basic consensus on the necessity of combating 
discrimination. 
In addressing incitement, the American draft would have outlawed 
direct incitement to acts of racist violence.115 It would have disal-
lowed government involvement in chartering or supporting racist hate 
groups. This was consistent with American constitutional principles. 
The USSR/Poland draft would have banned all "propaganda" of "su-
periority" and would have criminalized participation in any organiza-
tion that discriminated or advocated discrimination.116 In obvious 
contrast to the American view, the socialist nations proposed direct 
action against hate messages, expressing little concern for an individu-
alistic, civil libertarian conception of free speech. 
Discussion by the Commission on Human Rights centered around 
the problems of proving when propaganda was likely to cause vio-
lence, and whether violence was the only end to avoid. 117 The prob-
lem of freedom of association and the banning of hate organizations 
was also discussed. The final decision, by a vote of 16 in favor and 5 
abstentions, was to adopt paragraph 4(b) as it is now written, banning 
propaganda activity that promoted discrimination, and criminalizing 
participation in organizations promoting discrimination. 118 The 
weaker American position was thus rejected by the Commission. 
The proposed convention next went to the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly in 1965. Again the issues of the necessity of ties to 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 15) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). 
114. N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 4-5. 
115. Revised draft of article 4 submitted to the Sub-Commission by Mr. Abram, Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 
Sub.2/L.308/Add.l/Rev.l (1964). This view is consistent with American case law. See, e.g., 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
116. Draft of article 4 submitted by Messrs. Ivanov and Ketrzynski, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.314 
(1964). 
117. See N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 44-45 (discussions among, inter alia, representatives 
of Denmark, India, and Costa Rica on the role of incitement to violence). 
ll8. Id. at 45. 
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violence and of recognition of free speech rights were raised. 119 The 
United States proposed explicit recognition of the right of free speech 
within the text. 120 The Committee chose instead to refer generally to 
"due regard" of article 5 rights. Acts of violence were prohibited, but 
the final form of the proposed article went further. It also outlawed 
the mere dissemination of racist ideas, without requiring proof of in-
citement. An atmosphere of hatred, it was argued by the Polish repre-
sentative, would inevitably lead to discrimination.121 
When the draft finally reached the General Assembly, Argentina, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru - countries relatively friendly 
to the United States - proposed deletion of the dissemination-of-ideas 
language. This amendment was rejected - 54 against, 25 in favor, 
and 23 abstaining122 - but the limited consensus on this point indi-
cates the controversial nature of the article. Notably, in other areas of 
international human rights consensus building, serious ideological 
controversy dooms a proposal to failure. Language banning anti-Sem-
itism, for example, died a political death because of Arab and Soviet 
concerns that the charge of anti-Semitism would be used as a political 
weapon against them. 123 Article 4 is unique in that a clearly contro-
versial proposition survived in the final Convention. The survival of 
article 4, in spite of the controversy, indicates the overriding strength 
of the basic idea that promotion of racism is a serious threat to the 
protection of human rights. 
The General Assembly debates on article 4 focused on free speech. 
While the issue was never clearly resolved, it is significant that no 
country, not even the United States, was willing to abandon the basic 
premise of article 4. The article declares that states parties "condemn 
all propaganda . . . based on ideas or theories of superiority . . . or 
which attempt[s] to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimina-
tion in any form." 124 Similarly, the preamble to the Convention states 
explicitly that "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentia-
tion is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and 
dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimina-
tion." 125 The community of nations has thus made a commitment, 
119. Id. at 45-46. 
120. Id. at 46. 
121. Mr. Ketrzynski, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.418 at 14-15 (1964). 
122. N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 46. 
123. See id. at 71-73; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human 
Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 1059-60 (1975), 
124. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 105, at 218. 
125. Id. at 214. 
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with United States support, to the elimination of racism. It has recog-
nized that racist hate propaganda is illegitimate and properly subject 
to control under the international law of human rights. The debate, 
then, centers around the limits of such control, not around the basic 
decision to control racism. 
The Convention, including article 4, was unanimously adopted by 
the General Assembly on December 21, 1965.126 Under U.N. treaty 
procedure, it entered into force on January 4, 1969, and gathered an 
increasing number of state signatures over the years. 127 The United 
States was an early signatory to the convention, consistent with its 
significant role in drafting and promoting the convention from the ear-
liest stages. In 1978 President Carter submitted the convention to the 
Senate for ratification.128 The Senate has taken no significant steps 
toward ratification. Signature does not bind the United States to the 
treaty until the signing is ratified. Under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties a state's signature does, however, bind it to refrain 
from defeating the object of the treaty. 129 
The procedure for signature and ratification allows reluctant states 
to reserve the right to reject antipropaganda laws that would interfere 
with the right of free speech. 130 Such states apparently felt that the 
"due regard" clause of article 4 was not explicit enough to reserve this 
right. 
Some commentators suggest that the United States should not rat-
ify the Convention without explicit reservation to article 4, because the 
due regard clause is not "a sufficient safeguard for the rights set forth 
in the First Amendment." 131 In signing the Convention, the United 
States made a relatively short reservation, stating: 
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the pro-
tection of individual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing 
in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation 
or other action by the United States of America incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America. 132 
This limited reservation indicates the United States' basic position of 
support for the Convention. Such support is consistent with the 
126. 20 U.N. GAOR (1406th plen. mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1406 (1965). 
127. N. LERNER, supra note 106, at 155. 
128. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 110, at 130. 
129. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 336. 
130. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 105, art. 20, at 236. 
131. N. NATHANSON & E. SCHWELB, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 8 (Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 9, 1975). 
132. Id. at 85. 
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American ideological commitment to equality and with the need to 
maintain international prestige.133 The reservation and the failure to 
ratify the convention separates the United States from an evolving 
world standard. As discussed below, this position represents an ex-
treme commitment to the first amendment at the expense of antidis-
crimination goals. 
The Convention is not the only expression of the emerging interna-
tional view. The need to limit racist hate messages is implicit in basic 
human rights documents such as the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both documents recognize 
the primacy of the right to equality and freedom from racism. 134 
Other human rights treaties, such as the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms135 and the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man136 also recog-
nize this primacy. The United States is also a party to an international 
convention on genocide that forbids, inter alia, incitement to geno-
cide.137 Finally, the existing domestic law of several nations - includ-
ing states that accept the western notion of freedom of expression -
has outlawed certain forms of racist speech. 138 
The United Kingdom, for example, under the Race Relations Act, 
has criminalized incitement to discrimination and incitement to racial 
hatred. 139 The Act criminalizes the publication or distribution of 
"threatening, abusive, or insulting" written matter or use of such lan-
guage in a public place. The United Kingdom standard originally dif-
fered from the international standard in that it required proof of intent 
133. Cf. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988) 
(history oflinkage between U.S. support for antidiscrimination law and claims of moral superior-
ity to the socialist world). · 
134. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c); Universal Declarion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
135. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED 
TEXTS, § 1 (7th ed. 1971). 
136. PAN AMERICAN UNION, FINAL ACT OF THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF AMERICAN STATES 38 (1948). 
137. The Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 3(c), 
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280, requires member states to prohibit "(d]irect and 
public incitement to commit genocide.'' The Convention was ratified by the United States Senate 
in 1986 with reservations noting that the United States Constitution would override any provi-
sions of the Convention. 132 CONG. REC. 2349-50 (Feb. 19, 1986). 
138. For an excellent review of European anti-hate speech laws, see Kretzmer, supra note 36, 
at 499-506. Domestic states of the United States have also enacted anti-hate group legislation 
and constitutional provisions, such as group libel laws. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 20; FLA. 
STAT.§§ 876.17-.20 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 14.12-.14 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1301-
1306 (1981). 
139. Race Relations Act of 1965, ch. 73 § 6(1), amended in 1976 and 1986. 
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to incite to hatred. The intent requirement was later dropped. 140 The 
Act is consistent with the international standard in that it recognizes 
that avoiding the spread of hatred is a legitimate object of the law, and 
that some forms of racist expression are properly criminalized. The 
legislative history of the Act suggests that the drafters were concerned 
with the spread of racist violence. 141 Imminent violence, however, was 
not the only object of the Act. The Act recognized the inevitable con-
nection between the general spread of race hatred and the spread of 
violence. While commentators have suggested that the Act is ineffec-
tive and capable of misuse, 142 the existence of the Act supports the 
growing international movement toward outlawing racist hate 
propaganda. 
Canada has similarly adopted a national statute governing hate 
propaganda. Sections 318 and 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code143 
outlaw advocacy of genocide, defined as, inter alia, an act designed to 
kill a member of an identifiable group. They also outlaw communica-
tions inciting hatred against any identifiable group where a breach of 
peace is likely to follow. The law further outlaws the expression of 
ideas inciting hatred if such expression is tied to a probable threat to 
order. 
The new Canadian Bill of Rights incorporates strong protections 
for freedom of speech and association.144 Conflict between the new 
bill of rights and the hate messages legislation has not prevented ac-
tions to limit hate speech. 145 
Australia and New Zealand also have laws restricting racist 
speech, 146 leaving the United States alone among the major common-
140. See Race Relations Act of 1976, ch. 74, § 70; Kretzmer, supra note 36, at 501 {discuss-
ing amendment dropping intent requirement because it "made it almost impossible to convict"). 
141. I. MACDONALD, RACE RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION LAW~ 8 (1969). 
142. See, e.g., id. at ~ 203. 
143. R.S.C. ch. C-46, §§ 318, 319 (1985). 
144. Constitution Act of 1982, § 2. 
145. Canadian cases allowing legal restraint of hate speech include Regina v. Keegstra, 19 
C.C.C. (3d) 254 (Alta. Q.B.) (1984), and Regina v. Zundel, 31 C.C.C. {3d) 97, 580 O.R. {2d) 129 
(Ont. C.A. 1987). 
146. See, e.g., the proposed amendments to the New South Wales Racial Discrimination Act 
reported in WOOMERA, June/July 1987, at 1 (allowing group defamation actions for racial slurs). 
Violent racist groups are gaining in membership and visibility in Australia. See Crisp, Harvest of 
Hate, THE BULLETIN, Apr. 4, 1989, at 42 (Australian Newsweek); see also J. Griffiths, Conflict in 
Society: Public Order v. Individual Liberty- Laws Against Incitement to Racial Hatred, Paper 
Delivered at Asia Pacific Lawyers Association Third General Assembly, Hawaii (Jan. 6-9, 1989) 
(on file with author) (noting anti-incitement act passed in New Zealand in 1971; Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal Radio Programme Standard prohibiting material likely to incite race ha-
tred, and proposed legislation in New South Wales banning hate speech). 
2348 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2320 
law jurisdictions in its complete tolerance of such speech. 147 What 
these laws and the United Nations Convention have in common is that 
they specify a particularly egregious form of expression for criminal-
ization. All ideas about differences between races are not banned. The 
definitive elements are discrimination, connection to violence, and 
messages of inferiority, hatred, or persecution. Thus the entire spec-
trum of what could be called racist speech is not prohibited. A belief 
in intellectual differences between the races, for instance, is not subject 
to sanctions unless it is coupled with an element of hatred or persecu-
tion. What the emerging global standard prohibits is the kind of ex-
pression that most interferes with the rights of subordinated-group 
members to participate equally in society, maintaining their basic 
sense of security and worth as human beings. 
The failure of American law to accept this emerging standard re-
flects a unique first amendment jurisprudence. This jurisprudence is 
so entrenched in American law that it at first seems irreconcilable with 
the values given primacy in article 4, such as the values of equality and 
full participation. In order to discuss the significance of this contra-
diction, it is necessary to consider the American position of tolerance. 
V. THE UNIQUELY AMERICAN APPROACH OF PROTECTION OF 
RACIST HATE PROPAGANDA: THE CIVIL 
LIBERTARIAN'S STORY 
Many foreign lawyers, including those from countries close to the 
United States in ideology, are perplexed by the uniquely American ap-
proach of protection of racist hate organizations. 148 American citizens 
themselves express frustration when they find that the Klan and the 
Nazis are free to march in public places, with publicly financed police 
protection. This section will state the American position, and attempt 
to make its strongest case. 149 This is a starting point for exploring the 
147. Nations outside of the common-law world have also adopted domestic anti-hate speech 
legislation. Professor Frances Olsen shared with me this law from Sweden: 
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other communication which is spread 
among the public threatens or expresses contempt for an ethnic group or other such group 
of persons with allusion to race, skincolour, national or ethnic origin or religious creed, he 
shall be sentenced for agitation against ethnic group to imprisonment for at most two years if 
the crime is petty, to pay a fine. 
SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16, § 8 (1986). This statute is also discussed in Lasson, Group Libel 
Versus Free Speech, When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 88 (1984). 
148. Author's discussion of racist speech with foreign lawyers. 
149. For a thoughtful judicial exposition of the American position, see Judge Decker's opin· 
ion in Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978). While tolerance of hate speech repre-
sents dominant first amendment thought, there is a record of thoughtful opposition to this view. 
See, e.g., Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727 
(1942) (arguing for legal restriction of racist speech). 
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dominant story of racism in American social life, and for showing that 
the American position is neither inevitable nor sound as a matter of 
democratic theory, constitutional doctrine, or value. 
By the American position, I refer to the position that would re-
quire reservation to article 4 and forbearance from other efforts to con-
trol racist speech, on the ground that restriction of racist hate 
propaganda and hate organizations is incompatible with the first 
amendment. 150 There is no single authoritative assertion of this posi-
tion. The discussion here thus addresses a composite of mainstream 
first amendment thinking. 
Getting a clear statement of the American position is not easy. 
First amendment doctrine is notably confused, 151 but a reading of the 
cases reveals the following core ideas.152 Freedom of expression, the 
argument goes, is the most fundamental right protected under the 
Constitution. Democratic, representative government presumes that 
people are free to think and say whatever they might, even the un-
thinkable. They can advocate the end of democracy. We risk the 
chance that they will prevail because to give government the power to 
control expression is an even greater threat. Power is jealous, and the 
temptation to stifle legitimate opposition is too great. 153 Thus under 
our system, there is "no such thing as a false idea."154 All ideas de-
150. See, e.g., Hauser, United Nations Law on Racial Discrimination, AM. J. INTL L., Sept. 
1970, at 114, 117 ("The [s]enatorial environment, I fear, would be extremely hostile. Civil liber-
tarian groups that I have spoken to have serious doubt about the convention as well .... The 
ideas in Article 4 fly directly against the American idea of free speech."); N. LERNER, supra note 
106, at 25-26 ("The long discussion on [a]rticle 4 dealt basically with the problems offreedom of 
speech and freedom of association, freedoms which are likely to be restricted by the provisions of 
the Convention."). The American position is exemplified by the results in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (free speech rights of Ku Klux Klan leader), and National Socialist Party v. 
Village of Skokie, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
At least one Supreme Court case has suggested that state group libel statutes directed at 
racist hate messages are constitutional. See Beauhamais v. ,Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
For a survey of commentary suggesting that Beauharnois never was or no longer is good law, 
see 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 655-59 (4th ed. 1976). For conflicting views of whether the Beauharnois doctrine is still 
effective, see the majority opinion and dissent in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
151. Archibald Cox states in the conclusion to his book on the first amendment that first 
amendment cases "often lack the full exposition necessary to fit the decisions into a coherent 
body oflaw." A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 89 (1981). Laurence Tribe has called current 
first amendment doctrine a "patchwork quilt of exceptions." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES 220 (1985). 
152. Professor Frederick Schauer points out that "free speech" is a shorthand for a number 
of different values and principles. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 
(1982). 
153. See National Committee Against Repressive Legislation, Petition to the United States 
lOlst Congress (Jan. 1989) (law professors' petition calling for legislation to curb FBI excesses, 
including infiltration, warrantless searches, court disruption, and surveillance, all without prob-
able cause or public accountability, infringing on legitimate political activity). 
154. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
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serve a public forum, and the way to combat anti-democratic ideas is 
through counter-expression. When all ideas are voiced freely, we have 
the greatest chance that the right results will obtain. 
We have no way of knowing what the right results are in advance. 
Ideas that were once accepted as truth we now reject. Because our 
ideas about what we want as a society are changing and emergent, we 
cannot say that certain ideas are unacceptable. New ideas often meet 
opposition, and we have seen new ideas, including major advances in 
civil rights, eventually become the majority position. We have no ba-
sis for distinguishing good from bad ideas, and the only logical choice 
is to protect all ideas.155 
If the state feels threatened by certain ideas, it is not without re-
course. It can use education and counter-speech to combat those 
ideas. It can control conduct or action arising from those ideas. Thus 
while the state cannot outlaw a militaristic political party, it can con-
trol the stockpiling of weaponry and punish any acts of violence.156 
Incitement to imminent violence is a related and acceptable point of 
intervention. 157 Such control is admittedly less effective than direct 
and preventive repression, but we have made the commitment to a free 
society, and we will not become un-free even in self-defense. To do 
otherwise abandons the basic foundation of democracy, rendering 
nonsensical any claim to necessity. Furthermore, if we accept that 
ours is a racist society, that is all the more reason to give primacy to 
the first amendment. The best means to combat racist oppression is 
the right of protest.15s 
Accepting this extreme commitment to the first amendment is 
neither easy, nor natural. It is a concept one must learn, 159 and it 
barely survives the hard cases. There is much speech that comes close 
155. Dean Bollinger suggests that possible truth is not a reason for protecting racist speech. 
L. BOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 242-43. Professor Frederick Schauer has also noted that we 
have relative levels of uncertainty of the truth-value of any given statement, and that low 
probability of truth is rationally weighed against the harm of certain speech. F. SCHAUER, supra 
note 152, at 15-34. To their credit, most civil libertarians avoid claiming possible truth as a basis 
for protecting racist speech, arguing instead that racist lies must be protected in order to preserve 
free speech for all. See, e.g., A. NEIER, supra note 36. 
156. Attempts to limit hate group activity typically call forth opposition by civil libertarians. 
See, e.g., Moore, Oregon's Paramilitary Activities Statute: A Sneak Attack on the First Amend· 
ment, 20 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 335 (1984) (criticizing 1983 Or. Laws, ch. 792, § 2 (prohibiting 
paramilitary assembly, training, and display of paramilitary weaponry)). 
157. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy of violence protected and 
distinguished from actual, imminent violence). 
158. This point was made by Alan Borovoy, a Canadian civil libertarian, in his speech at the 
State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. Language as Violence, supra note 3, at 
339-44. Mr. Borovoy argued that the tactic of creative tension - of causing offense - is essen· 
tial to civil rights activists. Id. at 340. 
159. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 12 (1970). 
August 1989) Racist Speech 2351 
to action. Conspiratorial speech, inciting speech, fraudulent speech, 
obscene speech, and defamatory speech are examples of words that 
seem to emerge from human mouths as more than ideas. Examples 
might include a merchant's lies about the efficacy of a product, a gang 
leader's order to murder an enemy, sexual description broadcast to an 
audience of children, and threats of physical harm.160 The American 
doctrine recognizes a few limited categories of speech that take on 
qualities beyond expression. These areas are doctrinally distinct, 161 
and our commitment to the first amendment value requires the most 
vigilant scrutiny to avoid suppression of ideas under the guise of con-
trolling conduct.162 
What the American position means in the area of race is that ex-
pressions of the ideas of racial inferiority or racial hatred are pro-
tected. Anyone who wants to say that African Americans and Jews 
are inferior and deserving of persecution is entitled to. However loath-
some this idea may be, it is still political speech. The law becomes 
strong at its edges. If we can hold fast to freedom when it is most 
difficult to do so, we will avoid making the easy and disastrous 
mistakes. 
The strongest argument against criminalization of racist speech is 
that it is content-based.163 It puts the state in the censorship business, 
with no means of assuring that the censor's hand will go lightly over 
"good" as opposed to "bad" speech. 164 Critics cite the Canadian expe-
rience of words of protest and satire mistakenly challenged using race-
160. These examples are suggested in id. at 18. See also Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and 
the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (1983). 
161. Any categorization of acceptable and unacceptable speech is problematic for civil liber-
tarians. Thus some feminists have argued against antipornography laws, fearing "highly subjec-
tive criteria that masquerade as simple, delineating definitions." Brief Amici Curiae of the 
Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., at 8, American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-3147), ajfd. mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reprinted in Hunter & 
Law, Brief Amici Curiae of the Feminist Censorship Taskforce, et al, in American Booksellers 
Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 107 (1988). 
162. Thus the act of flag burning is protected because of the idea embodied in the act. See 
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). 
163. The Skokie court made a strong distinction between conduct and words, suggesting that 
words that shock because of the idea expressed are absolutely protected from criminal prosecu-
tion. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978). The possibility of a tort action was 
left open. 578 F.2d at 1206. See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D. III. 1978) 
("defendants have no power to prevent plaintiffs from stating their political philosophy, includ-
ing their opinions of black and Jewish people, however noxious and reprehensible that philoso-
phy may be"). 
164. In speaking on this topic, I've found the most serious objection raised by lawyers in the 
audiences is that of the slippery slope - that we must never censor because censorship, once 
allowed, is beyond control. In answer, I acknowledge that this is the central civil liberties con-
cern, and argue that it is as well met by narrowly defining racist speech as it is by other first 
amendment exceptions. We have already taken those first steps down the icy mountain, we have 
already abandoned the flat plane of absolutism. Cf Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
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hatred laws, 165 or the British experience, where censorship of racism is 
accompanied by censorship of political dissidents. If we outlaw the 
Ku Klux Klan as an organization repugnant to democratic values, 
then we can outlaw the Communist Party for the same reasons. Ad-
mitting one exception will lead to another, and yet another, until those 
in power are free to stifle opposition in the name of protecting demo-
cratic ideals. 
A related and less persuasive argument is the fresh air position. 
This position suggests that the most effective way to control the Klan 
is to allow it to broadcast its ideas. When people are exposed to the 
hatred propagated by the Klan, they will reject it and organize against 
it. Suppressing the Klan will only force it to choose more violent and 
clandestine means of obtaining its goals. 166 
A corollary to the American position of protection of racist expres-
sion is that the government must take certain affirmative steps to pre-
serve that right. 167 The state must make public facilities available on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to individuals and groups wishing to express 
their race hatred.168 It must provide police protection to preserve or-
der and protect speakers who are threatened by counter-demonstra-
tors.169 Since groups like the Klan typically draw angry opposition 
when they parade in public streets, this has meant that the Klan is 
entitled to publicly financed police escorts. Without this, the right of 
361 (1985) (discussing slippery slope arguments as logical fallacy. Professor Schauer points out 
that both sides in any legal argument can make slippery slope claims). 
165. See Language as Violence, supra note 3, at 341 (in Windsor, Ontario, members of the 
French minority were prosecuted for publishing a mock anti-French pamphlet intended to show 
the absurdity of bigotry). 
166. This position is in contradiction to the historical record: escalating racist speech always 
accompanies escalating racist violence. See, e.g., H. SHAPIRO, supra note 73. Where official and 
community condemnation of hate crimes is swift and vigorous, incidents tend to remain isolated. 
Where condemnation is not forthcoming, acts of hate tend to escalate. Cf HATE GROUPS, supra 
note 38, at 6 (testimony of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith comparing the responses to 
fire bombings of East Haven and West Haven, Connecticut, concluding that to avoid repetition 
"[t]he people that conduct these kinds of acts must know that the community, the total commu-
nity, does not support them, that they are pariahs"). 
167. T. EMERSON, supra note 159, at 627 (chapter entitled "Affirmative Promotion of Free-
dom of Expression"). 
168. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (school board thwarted in effort to stop KKK meeting in gym, but no fees awarded to 
KKK); Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981) (KKK granted permis-
sion to use public ball park; no fees against city); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th 
Cir. 1972) (first amendment right of access for Nazis to speak in public park). 
169. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1209 ("the governmental interest ... could more nar-
rowly be served by .•. marshalling local, county, and state police to prevent violations"); cf 
Invisible Empire v. Mayor, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988) (costs of police protection for KKK 
marchers must be borne by the town, not imposed on the marchers themselves); Invisible Empire 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of W. Haven, 600 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (D. Conn. 1985) 
(passing on the costs of police protection to marchers would amount to a "hecklers' veto"). 
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free speech is meaningless. Angry and intolerant majorities could pre-
vent unpopular minorities from using public facilities, rendering the 
right of free speech illusory. 
The strong first amendment position outlined above represents cer-
tain values170 that are part of the American structure of government 
and the American commitment to political and civil rights. The 
American position may be extreme, but it responds to American cir-
cumstances. It recalls the times when our commitment to freedom 
was tested - the Sedition Act, the McCarthy era, the movement for 
racial justice, the riots and protests of the Vietnam age. Our commit-
ment to the position has been neither steadfast nor universal. 171 
Judges have sometimes failed to understand it, resulting in loose doc-
trinal ends. 172 The basic principle, however, has survived, and the 
thrust of the cases and commentary supports first amendment 
primacy. 
The purpose of stating the strongest possible case for the American 
position is not merely to set the groundwork for an attack. The basic 
values of freedom of expression, while not provable in any natural law 
sense, are accepted by the international community. That the Ameri-
can commitment to the ideology of freedom has contributed to social 
progress and the limitation of repression is a part of our history. 173 
The question presented here is whether the values of the first amend-
ment are in irresolvable conflict with the international movement to-
ward elimination of racist hate propaganda, and whether any attempt 
to move United States law toward the international standard is 
worthwhile. 
As a starting point in understanding what is really going on in the 
law of freedom of expression, it is helpful to note where the edges are. 
170. Thomas Emerson, in his statement of the American position, identifies these values: 
(1) Self-fulfillment, or the idea that each individual has the right to "his character and 
potentialities as a human being." 
(2) Advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth, through free and vigorous ex-
change of a wide spectrum of ideas. 
(3) Participation in political decisionmaking, which requires both access to knowledge 
and the right to express an opinion. 
(4) Obtaining a stable community - by resolving conflict in the arena of open ex-
change of ideas. This promotes flexibility, gives everyone a stake in the process, and avoids 
the violent movement for change that would result from repression. 
T. EMERSON, supra note 159, at 6-7. 
171. See B. SCHULTZ & R. SCHULTZ, IT DID HAPPEN HERE: RECOLLECTIONS OF POLIT-
ICAL REPRESSION IN AMERICA (1989). 
172. For a laudable effort to conceptualize and clarify the underpinnings of existing doctrine, 
see Sunstein, supra note 66. 
173. For cases close to home, see those upholding the free speech rights of lawyers, e.g., In re 
Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (lawyer reinstated after disbarment for vigorous protest against 
Smith Act trials). 
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There are several forms of speech that are not entitled to the same 
protection that existing doctrine would afford racist propaganda. 
In the area of commerce and industrial relations, expression is fre-
quently limited. 174 False statements about products, 175 suggestions 
that prices be fixed, 176 opinions about the value of stock, 177 and pro-
employer propaganda during union elections, 178 are all examples of 
expressions of ideas that are limited by the law. An instrumental anal-
ysis might be that smooth operation of the entities of commerce, and 
the need for a stable setting for the growth of capital, have overcome 
the commitment to civil liberties in these instances. A doctrinal first 
amendment explanation is that those are examples of hard cases, rep-
resenting more than the expression of an idea. Some statements are 
noncommunicative acts, subject to legal restraint. 179 Alternatively, 
some would argue that many existing exceptions are simply a mistake. 
Speech and associational rights are limited in certain professional 
contexts. Government employees are forbidden from engaging in 
political activity to avoid problems of undue infiuence. 180 Those 
charged with the public trust are asked to profess loyalty to the Con-
stitution, 181 and are asked to limit expression that will undermine their 
ability to do their job. 182 The class of less-favored speakers has in-
cluded, dubiously, children183 and prisoners. 184 These exceptions sug-
174. See Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988) for the suggestion that the value of free speech is weakened by incre-
mental decisionmaking on peripheral subjects such as commercial speech. 
175. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). See generally Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
1191 (1965) {false advertising); Note, Constitutional Realism: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Adver-
tisements and the First Amendment, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1193. 
176. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
177. Securities Act of 1933 as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. 1989) (impos-
ing liability for misleading statements in connection with the sale of securities). 
178. Courts have recognized that in the labor context, employer speech can have a coercive 
effect upon employees who fear economic reprisal. Thus the employer's right to free speech is 
balanced against the employee's right to organize. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 
575 (1969) {applying 29 U.S.C. § 158). A major premise of the national labor law scheme is that 
collective bargaining promotes labor peace and economic development. 
179. Professor John Hart Ely has explored the difference between the restraint of acts and 
the restraint of communication, searching for the commmunicative elements of certain acts. Ely, 
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment 
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). For elaboration of the content/act distinction, see 
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). 
180. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1982) (regulating political activity of certain state and local 
employees); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7328 {1982) (governing political activities of federal employees). 
181. See, e.g., Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), ajfd. per 
curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968). 
182. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 {1985); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
183. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (censorship of student-
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gest that internal security and the functioning of government are other 
policies that override the first amendment in specific cases, to the legit-
imate discomfort of committed civil libertarians. 
The override occurs again in the area of privacy and defamation. 
Expressing intimate and private facts about a private individual is sub-
ject to civil damages, as is the spread of untruths damaging to both 
public and private figures. 185 First amendment protections are worked 
into the law of defamation and privacy, but they are not allowed to 
supersede completely the reputational interest and personal integrity 
of the victims of certain forms of expression. When courts are called 
into private disputes about defamatory speech, they are really mediat-
ing between competing interests of constitutional dimension: the right 
of expression, and the implicit right to a measure of personal integrity, 
peace of mind, and personhood. 
Speech infringing on public order is another classic unprotected 
area. Bomb threats, incitements to riot, "fighting words," 186 and ob-
scene phone calls are a few of the speech-crimes that slip through the 
first amendment's web of protection. These categories edge close to 
the category of racist speech.187 Under existing law, insults of such 
dimension that they bring men - this is a male-centered standard -
to blows are subject to a first amendment exception. 188 The problem is 
that racist speech is so common that it is seen as part of the ordinary 
jostling and conflict people are expected to tolerate, rather than as 
fighting words. 189 Another problem is that the effect of dehumanizing 
run school newspaper allowed); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
(censorship of sexual innuendo in student's campaign speech to a school assembly allowed). 
184. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (censorship of incoming mail allowed); Pell 
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights 
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the penological objectives of the 
system"). 
185. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limitation on defamation actions 
by public officials); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation action by 
private figure); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 
(1976) (publication of true private facts). 
186. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (limitation of speech and in-
sults that provoke violence). 
187. See Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28 DE PAULL. 
REV. 259 (1979) (arguing that displaying swastika before individuals with known susceptibility 
to severe emotional distress because of past persecution falls within "fighting words" doctrine); 
see also Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. 
Tex. 1982) (injunction against Klan demonstrations and paramilitary training designed to intimi-
date Vietnamese shrimpers falls within "fighting words" doctrine). 
188. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
189. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982) (use of word n-r 
and aggressive physical hazing and racist slurs were considered typical of offshore oil rig banter 
and "male interaction," and hence not violative of Title VII.) See also Howard v. National Cash 
Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (listing racist slurs as part of the historical 
"language of the factory"). 
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racist language is often flight rather than fight. 190 Targets choose to 
avoid racist encounters whenever possible, internalizing the harm 
rather than escalating the conflict. Lack of a fight and admirable self-
restraint then defines the words as nonactionable.191 When racist leaf-
lets threatening Representative Tyrone Brooks urged whites to band 
together to keep civil rights activists out of Rome, Georgia, state offi-
cials felt that the first amendment prevented arrest because the leaflet 
"didn't threaten to kill anyone."192 
While it is sometimes suggested that the first amendment is abso-
lute, even strong civil libertarians are likely to admit that the absolutist 
view is unworkable.193 As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed 
out, absolute protection of expression would render unconstitutional 
"all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and much of criminal 
law."194 The need to distinguish protected from unprotected speech is 
inevitable. 
If there are important competing interests represented in the inter-
national position on elimination of racist hate messages, if these inter-
ests are only met by limiting speech, and if the speech represented in 
racist hate propaganda is not the kind of speech most needful of pro-
tection, then it may be possible to remain true to the first amendment 
without protecting racist hate propaganda. 
The following section will suggest that an explicit and narrow defi-
nition of racist hate messages will allow restriction while respecting 
first amendment values. 
VI. NARROW APPLICATION AND PROTECTION OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT VALUES 
This Article attempts to recognize and accommodate the civil lib-
ertarian position. The victim's perspective requires respect for the 
idea of rights, for it is those on the bottom who are most hurt by the 
absence of rights, and it is those on the bottom who have sustained the 
190. Or, to deny it. See supra note 87. 
191. As the draft comments to the Stanford University Fundamental Standard Interpretation 
on Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment pointed out, it is unfair to use victims' disci-
plined practice of nonviolence or their demoralized, passive state as proof that insults are not 
"fighting words." Stanford University, Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression 
and Discriminatory Harassment 6 (Final Draft passed Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Fundamental 
Standard] (on file with author). 
192. HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 27. 
193. For suggestion of an absolutist position, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
194. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 
265, 270 (1981). 
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struggle for rights in American history. 195 The image of book burn-
ings should unnerve us and remind us to argue long and hard before 
selecting a class of speech to exclude from the public domain.196 I am 
uncomfortable in making the suggestions made in this section if others 
fall too easily into agreement. 
In order to respect first amendment values, a narrow definition of 
actionable racist speech is required. Racist speech is best treated as a 
sui generis category, presenting an idea so historically untenable, so 
dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of 
the very classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond 
that it is properly treated as outside the realm of protected dis-
course.197 The courts in the Skokie case198 expressed doubt that prin-
ciples were available to single out racist speech for public limitation. 
This section attempts to construct a doctrinal and evidentiary world in 
which we might begin to draw the lines the Skokie courts could not 
imagine. 
The alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively differ-
ent because of its content is to continue to stretch existing first amend-
ment exceptions, such as the "fighting words" doctrine and the 
"content/conduct" distinction.199 This stretching ultimately weakens 
the first amendment fabric, creating neutral holes that remove protec-
tion for many forms of speech. Setting aside the worst forms of racist 
speech for special treatment is a non-neutral, value-laden approach 
that will better preserve free speech. 
In order to distinguish the worst, paradigm example of racist hate 
messages from other forms of racist and nonracist speech, three identi-
fying characteristics are suggested here: 
1. The message is of racial inferiority; 
2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; 
and 
3. The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. 
195. For an elaboration of this point, see Matsuda, supra note 20, at 323. 
196. Cf Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("school officials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas 
or social perspectives discussed in them"). 
197. Professor David Kretzmer has argued that racism is unique for two reasons: the "cata-
strophic historical experience" and the "universal formal condemnation." Kretzmer, supra note 
36, at 458. 
198. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 
366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), modified, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
199. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Assn. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 
208 (1982) (using "conduct" and "fighting words" distinctions to limit Klan activity). 
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Making each element a prerequisite to prosecution prevents open-
ing of the dreaded floodgates of censorship. 
The first element is the primary identifier of racist speech: racist 
speech proclaims racial inferiority and denies the personhood of target 
group members. All members of the target group are at once consid-
ered alike and inferior. 
The second element attempts to further define racism by recogniz-
ing the connection of racism to power and subordination. Racism is 
more than race hatred or prejudice. It is the structural subordination 
of a group based on an idea of racial inferiority. Racist speech is par-
ticularly harmful because it is a mechanism of subordination, reinforc-
ing a historical vertical relationship. 
The final element is related to the "fighting words" idea. The lan-
guage used in the worst form of racist speech is langauge that is, and is 
intended as, persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. 
Part VII, below, applies these three elements to hypothetical cases. 
Using these elements narrows the field of interference with speech.200 
Under these narrowing elements, arguing that particular groups are 
genetically superior in a context free of hatefulness and without the 
endorsement of persecution is permissible. Satire and stereotyping 
that avoids persecutorial language remains protected. Hateful verbal 
attacks upon dominant-group members by victims is permissible. 
These kinds of speech are offensive, but they are, in respect of first 
amendment principles, best subjected to the marketplace of ideas. 
This is not to suggest that we remain silent in the face of offensive 
speech of this type. Rather, the range of private remedies - includ-
ing counter-speech, social approbation, boycott, and persuasion -
should apply.201 
If the most egregious, paradigmatic racial hate messages are not 
properly left to private remedy, it is important to explain why. One 
way to explain this is to consider the difference between racist hate 
200. Another narrowing device is an intent test. The requisite intent suggested under this 
scheme is an intent to speak to an audience - "publication" in the common law scheme - and 
actual or imputed - "should have known" - knowledge of the offensive character of the words. 
Others have suggested broader definitions of racist speech, using "intent to defame" as the test. 
See Lasson, supra note 147, at 126. Narrow and clear definition is consistent with the over-
breadth doctrine: any rule that prohibits unprotected speech but that could also prohibit pro-
tected speech is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972). 
201. The ability to discuss and deal privately with some forms of offensive language is shown 
in a recent exchange between B'nai B'rith International and the American-Arab Anti Discrimi-
nation Committee ("ADC"). The ADC objected to a fundraising letter that alleged that "Arab 
money is pouring into college campuses" and that "the Arab presence ... is poisoning the minds 
of our young people." B'nai B'rith Apologizes for Letter Containing Anti-Arab Statements, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at 14, col. 4. Letters of protest from the ADC, New Jewish Agenda, and 
various church groups resulted in withdrawal of the offensive letters. Id. 
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messages and Marxist speech. Marxist speech is the kind of unpopular 
political expression the first amendment is intended to protect. Marx-
ist speech is, according to a once prevalent view, the advocacy of over-
throw of existing governments, inevitably leading to dictatorships and 
persecution of dissidents and capitalists. It is thus, it was argued, dan-
gerous speech, properly censored. The legacy of this view was 
McCarthyism and the shattered lives of hundreds of decent citizens. 202 
How can one argue for censorship of racist hate messages without 
encouraging a revival of McCarthyism? There is an important differ-
ence that comes from human experience, our only source of collective 
knowledge. We know, from our collective historical knowledge, that 
slavery was wrong. We know the unspeakable horror of the holocaust 
was wrong. We know white minority rule in South Africa is wrong. 
This knowledge is reflected in the universal acceptance of the wrong-
ness of the doctrine of racial supremacy. There is no nation left on 
this planet that submits as its national self-expression the view that 
Hitler was right. 203 South Africa is alone204 in its official policy of 
apartheid, and even South Africa, in making its case to the world com-
munity, is careful to avoid an explicit ideology of racial supremacy, 
preferring instead the rhetoric of one-step-at-a-time. At the universi-
ties, at the centers of knowledge of the international community, the 
doctrines of racial supremacy and racial hatred are again uniformly 
rejected. At the United Nations the same is true. We have fought 
wars and spilled blood to establish the universal acceptance of this 
principle. The universality of the principle, in a world bereft of agree-
ment on many things, is a mark of collective human progress. The 
victim's perspective, one mindful of the lessons of history, thus accepts 
racist speech as sui generis and universally condemned. 
Marxist speech, on the other hand, is not universally condemned. 
Marxism presents a philosophy for political organization, distribution 
of wealth and power, ordering of values, and promotion of social 
change. By its very content it is political speech going to the core of 
ongoing political debate. Many nations adhere to Marxist ideology, 
and it is impossible to achieve world consensus either for or against 
202. See E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: McCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 
(1986). For a moving account of the effects of McCarthyism on one family, see K. CHERNIN, IN 
MY MOTHER'S HOUSE (1983). 
203. The uniform rejection of racist ideology is evidence of moral truth. I suggest more than 
an opinion poll test. I suggest as well that the doctrine of racial supremacy is wrong, both 
morally and factually, and that the consensus of human opinion helps us to know this. 
204. Cf Derrida, Racism's Last Word, HARPER'S, Feb. 1986, at 21, 22 (the word 
"apartheid" described as "the death rattle of what is already an interminable agony, something 
like the setting in the West of racism"). 
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this view. Marxists teach in universities. While Marxist ideas are re-
jected and abhorred by many, Marxist thought, like liberal thought, 
neoconservative economic theory, and other conflicting structures for 
understanding life and politics, is part of the ongoing efforts of human 
beings to understand their world and improve life in it. 
What is argued here, then, is that we accept certain principles as 
the shared historical legacy of the world community. Racial 
supremacy is one of the ideas we have collectively and internationally 
considered and rejected. As an idea connected to continuing racism 
and degradation of minority groups, it causes real harm to its victims. 
We are not safe when these violent words are among us. 
Treating racist speech as sui generis and universally condemned on 
the basis of its content and the harmful effect of its content is precisely 
the censorship that civil libertarians fear. I would argue, however, 
that explicit content-based rejection of narrowly defined racist speech 
is more protective of civil liberties than the competing-interests tests or 
the likely-to-incite-violence tests that can spill over to censor forms of 
political speech. 205 
Looking again to the emerging outsider jurisprudence, I derive ba-
sic principles: the need to fight racism at all levels, the value of explicit 
formal rules, and a fear of tyranny. These principles suggest the wis-
dom of legal intervention with only a narrowly defined class of racist 
hate propaganda. 206 
A range of legal interventions, including the use of tort law and 
criminal law principles, is appropriate to combat racist hate propa-
ganda. 207 While the value of free speech can guide the choice of proce-
dure - including evidentiary rules and burdens of persuasion - it 
205. Courts have rejected statutes that cast too wide a net over forms of expression. See, e.g., 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (city ordinance banning speech that brings about un-
rest is over-broad). 
206. Examples of the kind of over-broad statutes drafted to avoid regulation of racist content 
include "secret society" laws. See, e.g., New York ex rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 
(1928) (upholding a state law requiring all organizations to register and submit membership lists 
to the state, as used against KKK membership). 
207. In addition to judicial modification of first amendment analysis, the forms of remedy 
could include creation of a new crime of racist speech, enhanced sentencing for existing crimes 
where racial motivation is found, administrative mechanisms for fines and injunctive relief, civil 
actions for damages, or a combination of the above. Compare CAL. C1v. CODE § 51.7 (West 
1989) (civil remedies for violence motivated by racial hatred) and CAL. C1v. CODE§ 52.1 (West 
1989) (remedies for deprivation of rights motivated by racial hatred) and CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 422.6-.9 (West 1988) (criminal penalties for deprivation of rights because of race) and CAL, 
PENAL CODE§ 1170.75 (West 1988) (racial animus an aggravating factor in felony sentencing) 
with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1989) (creating a crime of "ethnic intimida-
tion" for violent and property crimes committed because of race) and Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§ 939.645 (West Supp. 1988) (raising penalties for crimes committed because of race) and Wis. 
STAT. ANN. § 943.012 (West Supp. 1988) (creating crime for damaging religous property). 
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should not completely remove recourse to the institution of law to 
combat racist speech. Racism as an acquired set of behaviors can be 
dis-acquired, 208 and law is the means by which the state typically pro-
vides incentives for changes in behavior. 
VIL HARD CASES 
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. 
There is no other way. 209 
Of course I emphasize different things, Doctor, because history has 
treated my people differently from yours. 210 · 
This section will consider stories at the edge, a tentative discussion 
of problem cases that may arise under the definition of actionable ra-
cist speech discussed here. The connecting thread in these examples is 
the need for clarity about the historical context in which racist speech 
arises, and attention to the degree of harm experienced by targets of 
different kinds of racist speech. 
A. A Case of the Angry Nationalist 
Expressions of hatred, revulsion, and anger directed against histor-
ically dominant-group members by subordinated-group members are 
not criminalized by the definition of racist hate messages used here. 
Malcolm X's "white devil" statements - which he later retracted -
are an example.211 Some would find this troublesome, arguing that 
any attack on any person's ethnicity is harmful. The harm and hurt is 
there, but it is of a different degree. Because the attack is not tied to 
the perpetuation of racist vertical relationships, it is not the paradigm 
worst example of hate propaganda. The dominant-group member 
hurt by conflict with the angry nationalist is more likely to have access 
to a safe harbor of exclusive dominant-group interactions. Retreat 
and reaffirmation of personhood are more easily attained for histori-
cally non-subjugated-group members. 
While white-hating nationalist expressions are troublesome both 
politically and personally, I would interpret an angry, hateful poem by 
208. See w. SEDLACEK & G. BROOKS, supra note 68, at 8-10. 
209. Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
210. Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? 
(Review Essay), 97 YALE L.J. 923, 937 (1988). 
211. MALCOLM x, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM x 251-52, 363 (1966); see also 
Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (African-American activists interrupt 
church services with taunts against "white Christian racists"); HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra 
note 61, at 17 (report of Iman Pilamen El Amin, Social Iman of the Atlanta Muslim Mission, 
describing the evolution of the American Muslim Mission since its 1975 adoption of the ideology 
of the oneness of all humanity, and abandonment of the white devil idea). 
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a person from a historically subjugated group212 as a victim's struggle 
for self-identity in response to racism.213 It is tied to the structural 
domination of another group.214 Part of the special harm of racist 
speech is that it works in concert with other racist tools to keep victim 
groups in an inferior position.215 Should history change course, plac-
ing former victim groups in a dominant or equalized position, the 
newly equalized group will lose the special protection suggested here 
for expression of nationalist anger. 
Critics of this proposal ask how one knows who is oppressed and 
who isn't. Poor whites, ethnic whites, wealthy ethnics - the confus-
ing examples and barriers to classification abound. The larger ques-
tion is how anyone knows anything in life or in law. To conceptualize 
a condition called subordination is a legitimate alternative to denying 
that such a condition exists.216 In law, we conceptualize. We take on 
mammoth tasks of discovery and knowing. We can determine when 
subordination exists by looking at social indicators: wealth, mobility, 
comfort, health, and survival tend to mark the rise to the top and fall 
to the depths.217 The rise and fall of group status is relevant even 
when an individual is a counterexample, because when the group is 
subordinated, even the lucky counterexample feels the downward 
212. See, e.g., Trask, racist white woman, BAMBOO RIDGE, Fall 1987, at 86. 
213. Nationalism may be an interim stage on the path to egalitarian vision. See Sizemore, 
Separatism: A Reality Approach to Inclusion, in RACIAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 249 
(R. Green ed. 1969). 
214. In an analogous context, the work of Catharine MacKinnon recognizes subordination of 
women and calls for laws addressing that subordination. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). Christine Littleton points out that the subordina-
tion approach differs significantly from the inequality approach. Inequality calls for equal treat-
ment. Subordination calls for an uplifting of women from a degraded status. See Littleton, supra 
note 31, at 768. 
215. An understanding of relative power is implicit in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 
252 (1952) (allowing action against pamphlet calling for the "white people in Chicago to unite" 
against becoming "mongrelized" and against "the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns 
and marijuana of the negro") (omission in original), in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (recognizing that segregation carries a message of African-American inferiority), and in 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (speech rights 
of African-American civil rights protesters upheld against libel action by white sheriff). These 
cases, decided against a subtext of racial subordination, reveal the Court struggling to design 
neutral rules to deal with a decidedly unequal context, and siding with the subordinated group in 
each case. Justice Black in his Beauharnais dissent warned that the Court was taking a step 
toward censorship of legitimate social protest including protest by minorities. New York Times 
is, in a sense, a rejoinder to Justice Black. 
216. Cf. Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1003 (1986) (arguing for primacy of antisubordination principle over a neutral equality 
principle). 
217. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 210, at 938-41 & nn.88-111 (documenting statistical and 
historical evidence of subordination of nonwhites); Scales-Trent, supra note 17 (documenting 
degraded social status of African-American women). 
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tug.218 Luck is not the same as privilege. 
In some cases, a group's social well-being may improve, while their 
victimization continues. Asians who experience economic success are 
often underemployed relative to their talents.219 Jews who attain 
equality in employment still experience anti-Semitic vilification, har-
assment, and exclusion. 22° Catholics are relatively free from discrimi-
nation in some communities, and subject to vile bigotry in others.221 
Evidence of the relative subjugation of various groups is available to 
factfinders. 222 
In the same way that lawyers martial evidence in an adversarial 
setting to find facts in other areas oflaw, we can learn to do the same 
to know the facts about subordination, and to determine when hate 
speech is used as an instrument of that subordination. 223 
B. First Variation: Anti-Semitism and Racism by Non-Whites 
What of hateful racist and anti-Semitic speech by non-whites? The 
phenomena of one subordinated group inflicting racist speech upon 
another subordinated group is a persistent and touchy problem. Simi-
larly, members of a subordinated group sometimes direct racist lan-
guage at their own group. The victim's privilege becomes problematic 
when it is used by one subordinated person to lash out at another. 
While I have argued here for tolerance of hateful speech that comes 
from an experience of oppression, when that speech is used to attack a 
subordinated-group member, using language of persecution, and 
218. Minority law professors, typically privileged by class and education, still trade story 
after story of police harassment, racist insult, and white hostility. R. DELGADO, MINORITY 
LAW PROFESSORS' LIVES: THE BELL-DELGADO SURVEY (Institute for Legal Studies Working 
Papers Series 3:9, 1988); cf. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 
107, 148-49 (1976) (well-being and status of individuals is related to the status of the individual's 
group). 
219. See Kim & Hurh, Korean Americans and the "Success" Image: A Critique, AMERASIA 
J., Fall/Winter 1983, at 3. 
220. See, e.g., HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 13 (noting several instances of 
threats and attacks directed at Jews in Georgia including cross burnings, synagogue vandalism, 
bomb threats, and regular harassment of congregations leaving worship - including a car veer-
ing off the road to threaten teenagers leaving services, BB gun shooting at Passover, and verbal 
taunts such as "Hitler still lives"). 
221. See id. at 17 (noting resurgence of anti-Catholic bigotry in Georgia). 
222. For an argument that African-American women require heightened legal protection 
beyond that of white women or African-American men because of the historical circumstances of 
their two statuses that "have often combined in ways which are not only additive, but synergistic 
- that is, they create a condition for black women which is more terrible than the sum of their 
two constituent parts," see Scales-Trent, supra note 17, at 9. 
223. See HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, for an example of a formal effort to amass 
testimony on the reality of racism in one locality. 
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adopting a rhetoric of racial inferiority, I am inclined to prohibit such 
speech. 
History and context are important in this case because the custom 
in a particular subordinated community may tolerate racial insults as 
a form of word play.224 Where this is the case, community members 
tend to have a clear sense of what is racially degrading and what is 
not. The appropriate standard in determining whether language is 
persecutorial, hateful, and degrading is the recipient's community 
standard. We should avoid further victimization of subordinated 
groups by misunderstanding their linguistic and cultural norms. 
C. Second Variation: Zionism 
I reject the sweeping charge that Zionism is racism and argue in-
stead for a highly contextualized consideration of Zionist speech. To 
the extent any racial hostility expressed within a Zionist context is a 
reaction to historical persecution, it is protected under the doctrinal 
scheme suggested in this Article. Should white Zionists ever lose the 
victim's privilege? If Zionist speakers are white, do hateful, race-
bound expressions of theirs necessarily reinforce historical conditions 
of white dominance over brown and black people? The analysis must 
turn on the particular context. If a Zionist's expression of anger in-
cludes a statement of generic white supremacy and persecution, the 
speaker chooses to ally with a larger, historically dominant group, and 
the victim's privilege should not apply. On the other hand, angry, 
survivalist expression, arising out of the Jewish experience of persecu-
tion and without resort to the rhetoric of generic white supremacy, is 
protected under the contextualized approach. Again, it is important 
to add that the various subordinated communities are best equipped to 
analyze and condemn hate speech arising within their midst.225 
D. The Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist 
Another difficult case is that of the social scientist who makes a 
case for racial inferiority in an academic setting based on what is 
presented as scientific evidence. Various theories of genetic predisposi-
tion to violence, cultural lag, and race/intelligence correlation fall into 
this category.226 Critics note that these pseudo-scientific, Eurocentric 
224. See, e.g., C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 16 (1974) (discussing acceptable racial teasing be· 
tween African-American informants and a white anthropologist). 
225. I thus defer to the evolving judgment of the American and Israeli Jews and seek dia· 
logue with them on statements emerging from the Israeli far right. Cf Racism from the Right, 
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1984, at 44 (quoting Meir Kahane as stating, "I don't want to lose my 
country to Arab bullets or Arab babies" to supporters' shouts of "Death to Arabs!"). 
226. See, e.g., Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, S HARV. 
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theories are racist and ignorant. 227 This raises two separate questions. 
First, should such views receive an audience and a forum in an aca-
demic setting? Second, should we criminalize expressions of such 
views? 
As to the first question, the answer may well be no. Not all views 
deserve the dignity of an academic forum. Poorly documented, ra-
cially biased work does not meet the professional standards required of 
academic writing. If a writer manages to come up with a theory of 
racial inferiority supported by credible evidence, that theory may de-
serve a forum. Under the principle of academic freedom, ignorant 
views need not be heard, but unpopular academically tenable views 
should be. 
As to the second question, outlawing this type of speech might be 
inappropriate. 228 Assuming the dead-wrong social-science theory of 
inferiority is free of any message of hatred and persecution, the ordi-
nary, private solution is sufficient: attack such theories with open pub-
lic debate, and with denial of a forum if the work is unsound in its 
documentation. 
E. The Case of Wordless Speech: Symbols and Regalia, 
Text and Context 
There are certain symbols and regalia that in the context of history 
carry a clear message of racial supremacy, hatred, persecution, and 
degradation of certain groups. 229 The swastika, the Klan robes, the 
burning cross are examples of signs - like all signs - that have no 
meaning on their own, but that convey a powerful message to both the 
EDUC. REV. 1 (1969) (concluding that African Americans' lower IQ scores are due, in part, to 
genetic factors). But see s. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (crtiquing various 
pseudo·scientific claims of racial superiority). 
227. See A Theory Goes On Trial, TIME, Sept. 24, 1984, at 62 (Dr. Shockley, who admits 
subscribing to the white supremacist publication "Thunderbolt," is called "nearly incompetent" 
by trained geneticist). 
228. Compare Lassan, supra note 147, at 127 (arguing for restraint of Shockley's conclu-
sions) with Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1978) (suggesting revival of 
group defamation doctrine but arguing that statements of opinion, such as Shockley's, should be 
protected). The Yale Note is an attempt to penalize a limited class of racist speech, using com-
mon law principles such as the fact-opinion distinction, obloquy, and prurient interest. Such 
tests are tailored to the problems of obscenity and defamation, and do not adequately, in this 
author's opinion, confront the complexity of racist speech. 
229. See Danon, The Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Decisions Regarding Prior 
Restraint, in Skokie v. The American Nazi Party, 67 ILL B.J. 540, 541 (1979) (arguing that 
patterning conduct, uniform, slogan, and language after German Nazi Party "is equivalent of 
encouragement to identify with the genocide of the Jews and an indirect incitement to follow 
Hitler's 'final solution'"); Lassan, supra note 147, at 127 (arguing for limitation of swastika 
displays on a group libel theory). 
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user and the recipient of the sign in context. 230 
Here we must look to the history of these signs to understand what 
they mean. If the historical message, known to both victim and perpe-
trator, is racist persecution, then the sign is properly treated as action-
able racist speech.231 
F. The Cold Version of the Classic Forms of Anti-Semitism 
Anti-Semitic literature is one of the most highly developed and 
despicable forms of hate propaganda. A significant problem with the 
test proposed here is that it may, at first blush, seem too narrow to 
cover some chillingly sterile brands of anti-Semitic literature. The 
monetary conspiracy theories, the tales of mysterious cartels, the revi-
sionist histories distributed by anti-Semitic hate groups are sometimes 
cunningly devoid of explicit hate language.232 Here is another story: 
One recent summer, after giving a talk advocating restriction of hate 
speech, I was dutifully catching up on reading of academic junk mail -
newsletters, book announcements, requests for contributions. I picked up 
a leaflet, professionally printed and attributed to an academic institution, 
and began reading what looked like a mildly interesting historical essay. 
It was only after several paragraphs that I realized I was reading a holo-
caust hoax tract. My heart started racing as soon as I realized what a 
horrible thing I held in my hand. I felt fear and revulsion that I was 
targeted to receive this mail, and that it was written in such a way that I 
didn't immediately recognize it for what it was. I fished in the rubbish can 
for the envelope and found it had no return address - that should have 
been the tip-off. The California postmark gave me some relief. At least 
the writers were not in my immediate neighborhood. The fear, however, 
remains, and I am more cautious about where and to whom I will speak 
on this topic that brings hate to my desk 
I am inclined to criminalize the cold-blooded version of anti-
semitic literature. Given the historical record, this "cold" version is 
just as hateful, for all its tone of distorted rationality, as the "hot" 
name-calling versions. To call the holocaust a myth is to defame the 
230. See National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, Draft Legislation to Stop 
Racist Hate Group Activity, 44 GUILD PRAC. 131 (1987) (recognizing that white-hooded robes 
and masks, burning crosses, and swastikas are associated with acts of violence, and suggesting 
criminal and civil penalties for their use). 
231. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 27, § lOA (1987) (prohibition of cross burning 
without notice to authorities). 
232. Cj Taylor v. Canada, 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 193 (UN-Hum. Rts. Comm. 1983) (prosecution 
under Canadian law for recorded telephone message alleging that Jewish conspiracy would lead 
to financial collapse allowed); see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF 
B'NAI B'RITH, SPECIAL EDITION: THE LIBERTY LOBBY NETWORK (1987) (analyzing pseudo-
intellectual anti-Semitic groups); Note, supra note 228, at 331 & n.106 (discussing the Protocols 
of the Learned Elders of Zion, "a classic of anti-Semitic literature"). 
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dead, as Elie Wiesel has so eloquently put it. 233 It is a deep harm to 
the living. In a range of different contexts, the common law has recog-
nized the likelihood of emotional harm to the living from carelessness 
in treatment of the dead. 234 
The element of hatred and degradation is present in the monetary 
conspiracy theory and holocaust hoax literature. Like the swastika, 
these texts take their hateful meaning from their historical context and 
connection to violence. To anyone who knows that context they cause 
legitimate distress. 
G. Collections, Museums, Neutral Reportage, Humor, 
and Literary Realism 
YES/ Send me The SS, to examine for 10 days free, as my introduc-
tion to THE THIRD REICH.23s 
There are instances in which hate propaganda is deliberately 
spread by persons who are not themselves hatemongers. There are 
groups that preserve and disseminate hate propaganda for the purpose 
of educating the public of the evils of racism and anti-Semitism.236 
There are groups and individuals who collect racist memorabilia for 
reasons of collectability, sometimes also claiming an educative func-
tion, and other times for reasons of fondness for ephemeras of evil. 
There are news reporters who repeat racist speech in order to report 
the news of its utterance, law professors who repeat racist words in 
hypotheticals for class discussion of the first amendment. In these 
cases the hate message is spread for purposes other than persecution. 
The hateful message is once removed from direct transmission by a 
buffer zone of a nonpersecuting presenter. 
233. Address by Elie Wiesel, Hofstra University Conference on Group Defamation and Free-
dom of Speech (Apr. 20, 1988). 
234. See, e.g., Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (cause of 
action against medical examiner for removing body parts without survivor's permission); Ingag-
lio v. Kraeer Funeral Home, Inc., 515 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (cause of action for 
emotional distress for malicious mishandling of deceased husband's remains); The Neptune Soci-
ety Cases, 31 ATLA L. Rep. 223 (Sacramento County Super. Ct., Feb. 22, 1988) (settlement for 
failure to properly cremate and scatter remains as promised). 
Desecration of graves and memorials is a common tactic of hate groups. See, e.g., ArroR-
NEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 47, at 44 (desecration of memorial to a murdered 
Vietnamese youth in Davis, California); HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 14 (spray 
painting of Martin Luther King, Jr., crypt); HATE GROUPS, supra note 38, at 4 (in Connecticut, 
a statue of Martin Luther King, Jr., and a Holocaust memorial were defaced). 
235. From a clip-out coupon in a two-page advertisement for a Time-Life book series, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 6, 1989, at 42-43. The ad included portraits of S.S. figures and a 
small, color highlighted swastika in the lower left-hand comer. It in no way suggested approval 
of S.S. activities, although it did make me uneasy in its tone of fascination. 
236. See SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER, RESPONSE, supra note 58, at 4-5 (reprinting an anti-
Semitic cartoon and slurs for informational purposes). 
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When I viewed an Anti-Defamation League display of Nazi propa-
ganda, I felt a familiar, queasy revulsion - the same feeling I got 
when I viewed dusty spoils of war, emblazoned with swastikas, at the 
veterans' halls I visited with my father as a child. What I did not feel 
was the heart-racing fear engendered by hate propaganda from anony-
mous senders. Knowing the intent of the Anti-Defamation League 
made the presentation less intrusive. Knowing that the League is in 
constant dialogue with victim-group members, carefully considering 
the possible harms of neutral presentations of hate propaganda, was 
comforting on the intellectual level. 
The growing passion for collecting racist memorabilia is more 
troublesome.237 Not all collectors are involved in careful debate, 
weighing the harm of insult against the value of historic preservation. 
State intervention might be appropriate where collectors' displays 
cause gratuitous harm to viewers. The key to differentiating between 
the Anti-Defamation League display and a hypothetical Gestapo Col-
lector's Club display of lovingly polished storm-trooper paraphernalia 
is the victim's story. Rather than looking to the neutral, objective, 
unknowing, and ahistorical reasonable person, we should look to the 
victim-group members to tell us whether the harm is real harm to real 
people. 
Another area of seemingly less egregious speech is humor.238 Con-
sider this comment by an American judge: "Do you know how to 
make a [ethnic group] omelette? Well, first you have to go out and 
steal three eggs."239 Not only are these jokes unfunny, they are also 
cruel and hurtful in much the same way that racist epithets are.240 
237. In visiting an antique shop in Charleston, South Carolina, I noticed old Jim Crow signs 
for sale as collectors items and wondered who collected the signs, and for what reasons. The 
demand by collectors for such items is evidenced by ads in antique traders' magazines. 
Household items depicting African Americans in servile and degraded positions were com· 
mon from 1890 to the 1950s. See Dubin, Symbolic Slavery: Black Representations in Popular 
Culture, 34 Soc. PROBS. 122 (1987). Dubin catalogs a disgusting array of such items. Some 
such items include violent imagery intended as humor, such as children eaten by alligators, and 
golf tees driven into human heads. Dubin argues that popular culture does symbolic violence, 
implemented when other forms of control, such as slavery, are eliminated. Dubin uses the con· 
cept of cultural capital to explain how such items keep certain groups in subordinated positions. 
238. See State Div. of Human Rights v. McHarris Gift Center, 52 N.Y.2d 813, 418 N.E.2d 
393, 436 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1980), affg. 71 A.D.2d 813, 419 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1979) (ruling that display 
of Polish joke items does not deny equal access to stores to people of Polish descent). 
239. Statement of a judge handling a farm worker's case, reported in Judge Bradshaw: Bad 
Humor Man, FOOD AND JUSTICE, Apr., 1988, at 8 (a publication of the United Farm Workers). 
240. For dissents recognizing the harm of racist jokes, see McHarris Gift Center, 52 N.Y.2d 
at 814, 816, 418 N.E.2d at 393, 394 (Cooke, C.J., and Jansen, J., separately dissenting) (both 
arguing that Polish gag gifts infringe on free enjoyment of public accommodations). See also 
Racist and Sexist Jokes: How Bad Are They (Really)?, REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR PHI LOS· 
OPHY & PUBLIC POLICY, Spring/Summer 1987, at 9, 11 (discussing the forced resignations of 
Earl Butz and James Watt for telling racist jokes and noting that "[t]he distinctive wrong of 
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That they are said with a smile, and in a context that is socially under-
stood as a somewhat more appropriate·venue for insult, changes their 
character somewhat. It is a venue in which private sanction241 has 
some opportunity for success. The comedian Richard Pryor, for ex-
ample, has stated publicly that he has been persuaded to discontinue 
comedic use of a racial epithet in his performances. 242 
Similarly, in considering the use of racist slurs in the interests of 
realism in books, films, and theater, the experience of victim-group 
members is a guide. Writer-Director Spike Lee's recent film Do the 
Right Thing 243 contains a rapid-fire sequence of racial epithets spoken 
by characters from different racial groups in a Brooklyn neighbor-
hood. The hyper-realism of the sequence offers an incisive anti-racist 
critique of racist speech. Similarly, Mark Twain, known as a great 
American writer and anti-racist, used racist dialogue to portray a ra-
cist land. The problem for some African-American parents is that 
their young children may suffer harm from further exposure to racist 
language, particularly in a white majority setting. There is a danger of 
some of the students missing entirely, as one commentator noted,244 
the ironic message and simply enjoying a racist dialogue on its face. 
The failure of school integration and the under-representation of 
African Americans in positions of authority in the schools increases 
the danger that Mark Twain's realism, in some schools, will cause the 
kind of harm Twain himself would have abhorred. We need safe 
harbors before we begin rocking boats. 
Consider this story: 
A white teacher in Gould, Arkansas, resigned in tears after parental 
protests over her statement to boisterous school children that, "I think 
you're trying to make me think you're a bunch of poor, dumb n--rs, 
and I don't think that." Seats on the school board and other positions of 
authority in that town of sixty percent African-American residency, were 
occupied by African Americans. Students signed petitions urging the 
school board to reconsider its actions against the teacher, and to give her a 
second chance. The teacher was reinstated, expressing sincere regret for 
her error, and her thanks to the students for a second chance. A picture of 
the smiling white teacher, embracing an African-American student leader, 
racist and sexist jokes is that the stereotype they evoke and help to maintain are so deeply impli-
cated in our society's long history of injustice to disadvantaged groups"). 
241. The attorney for the United Farm Workers who heard the joke, supra note 239, re-
sponded, "I don't find ethnic jokes humorous. I don't tell them and I don't like to hear them." 
Judge Bradshaw: Bad Humor Man, supra note 239. 
242. Statement of Richard Pryor, in Live on the Sunset Strip (Columbia Pictures 1982). 
243. Do the Right Thing (Universal Pictures 1989). 
244. Marx, Huck at 100, 241 NATION 150 (1985). 
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accompanies the news item. 245 
Would that all incidents of hate speech have that ending: victims 
empowered, consciousness raised, community restored, harm kept at 
bay. Unfortunately for most of us, the conditions necessary for the 
result achieved in that small Arkansas town are not the conditions we 
live under. The harm of racist speech slices deeper, the farther away 
we are from such a life. 
H. The Special Case of Universities 
A marked rise of racial harassment, hate speech, and racially moti-
vated violence marks our entry into the 1990s.246 The epidemic of 
racist incidents on university campuses is a disturbing example of 
this. 247 The application of the first amendment to racist speech, once 
discussed hypothetically in law schools, is now debated in classrooms 
where hate messages have actually appeared.248 The next round of 
judicial opinions tangling with hate speech and the first amendment 
may well come from the universities. 
University administrators at public institutions are bound by the 
first amendment under state action doctrine. At private institutions, 
the principle of free speech is often evoked as a matter of ethics, re-
gardless of whether the Constitution applies directly. The university 
case raises unique concerns. Universities are special places, charged 
with pedagogy, and duty-bound to a constituency with special vulner-
abilities. Many of the new adults who come to live and study at the 
major universities are away from home for the first time, and at a vul-
nerable stage of psychological development. 249 Students are particu-
245. Black Students Forgive Teacher's Mistaken Slur, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1988, at 17, col. 
1. 
246. See, e.g., Anti-Semitic Incidents in 1988 Put at a 5-Year High, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 
1989, at 20, col. 1. 
247. See supra note 71. 
248. I heard reports of racist slurs appearing on blackboards at the State University of New 
York at Buffalo. To its credit, the School of Law issued a statement from the faculty warning 
that sanctions will be imposed for "racist, sexist, homophobic and anti-lesbian, ageist, and ethni-
cally derogatory statements" that indicate the student lacks "sufficient moral character to be 
admitted to the practice oflaw." Faculty Statement Regarding Intellectual Freedom, Tolerance, 
and Prohibited Harassment, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, Oct. 3, 
1987. 
249. The typical university student is emotionally vulnerable for several reasons. College is a 
time of emancipation from a pre-existing home or community, of development of identity, of 
dependence-independence conflict, of major decision making, and formulation of future plans. 
The move to college often involves geographic relocation - a major life-stress event - and the 
forging of new peer ties to replace old ones. All of these stresses and changes render the college 
years critical in development of one's outlook on life. College students experiment with different 
passions, identities, and risks. A negative environmental response during this period of experi-
mentation could mar for life an individual's ability to remain open, creative, and risk-taking. I 
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lady dependent on the university for community, for intellectual 
development, and for self-definition. Official tolerance of racist speech 
in this setting is more harmful than generalized tolerance in the com-
munity-at-large. It is harmful to student perpetrators in that it is a 
lesson in getting-away-with-it that will have lifelong repercussions. It 
is harmful to targets, who perceive the university as taking sides 
through inaction, and who are left to their own resources in coping 
with the damage wrought.25° Finally, it is a harm to the goals of in-
clusion, education, development of knowledge, and ethics that univer-
sities exist and stand for.251 Lessons of cynicism and hate replace 
lessons in critical thought and inquiry. 
The campus free speech issues of the Vietnam era,252 and those 
evoked by the anti-apartheid movement, pit students against univer-
sity administrators, multinational corporations, the U.S. military, and 
established governments. In the context of that kind of power imbal-
ance, the free speech rights of students deserve particular deference. 
Unfortunately, as we know from the memory of four dead in Ohio, 
that deference is not always forthcoming. 
Racist speech on campus occurs in a vastly different power con-
text. Campus racism targets minority students and faculty. Minority 
students often come to the university at risk academically, socially, 
and psychologically.253 Minority faculty are typically untenured, 
overburdened, isolated, or even nonexistent, as is the case at several 
thank my colleague Dr. Chalsa Loo, a psychologist, college counselor, and specialist in multicul-
tural interaction, for these insights. 
250. See, e.g., Wilkerson, supra note 61 (effects of racist speech at University of Michigan, 
including withdrawal from campus activities, obsession with racism, feelings of conspicuousness 
in classes, defensiveness, anger, shame, and helplessness). 
251. Some minority students are avoiding white-dominated universities altogether because of 
apprehension of racist attacks As a member of the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents 
testified: 
I now have a 17 year old son and he is getting ready to go off to college. Guess what? In 
spite of the fact that I am a member of the Board of Regents, he has no interest in attending 
the UW System. In fact, he has no interest in going anywhere where he will be subjected to 
harassment because of his color. To date, he has limited his exploration to only traditionally 
black schools. 
Testimony of Erroll B. Davis, Jr., before the Wisconsin Senate Education Co~mittee (Apr. 24, 
1989) (unpublished comments on file with author). 
252. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
253. Applegate & Henniger, Recruiting Minority Students: A Priority for the '90s, THOUGHT 
& ACTION, Spring 1989, at 53 (minorities underrepresented in professions, declining in college 
enrollment, and experiencing higher drop-out rates); Crenshaw, Forward: Toward a Race-Con-
scious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1, 2 (1989) (the norm of"perspective-
lessness" in law schools is a particular burden on minority law students); Loo & Rolison, 
Alienation of Ethnic Minority Students at a Predominantly White University, 57 J. HIGHER Eouc. 
58 (1986) (ethnic minority university students experience greater feelings of alienation and isola-
tion than white students). 
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law schools. 254 The marginalized position of minority faculty further 
marginalizes minority students. 
There is legal precedent for considering the status of the target in 
measuring the amount of freedom verbal attackers enjoy. In the law 
of defamation, private figures can more easily obtain damages for 
harm to their reputation than can public figures. This is based on the 
greater ability of public figures to launch an effective rebuttal and on 
their voluntary choice to enter the public eye. An additional implicit 
justification is that wealth, power, and fame provide ego support that 
helps one weather verbal abuse. If nothing else, the defamed movie 
star can retreat to Malibu. 
The student, like the private figure, has fewer avenues of retreat. 
Living on or near campus, studying in the library, and interacting with 
fellow students are integral parts of university life.255 When racist 
propaganda appears on campus, target-group students experience de-
bilitated access to the full university experience. This is so even when 
hate propaganda is directed at groups rather than individuals.256 
Students are analogous to the captive audience that is afforded spe-
cial first amendment consideration in other contexts.257 Similarly, stu-
dents who support universities through tuition and who are 
encouraged to think of the university as their home are involuntarily 
forced into a position of complicity with racism when their campus is 
254. See R. DELGADO, supra note 218 (reporting on widespread effects of discrimination and 
high attrition rates among minority law teachers); Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minori· 
ties and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988); Haines, 
Minority Law Professors and the Myth of Sisyphus: Consciousness and Praxis Within the Special 
Teaching Challenges in American Law Schools, 10 NATL. BLACK L.J. 247 (1988); McGee, Sym· 
bol and Substance in the Minority Professoriat's Future, 3 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 67 (1986) 
(special burdens and obligations of minority law professors). 
255. See BOARD OF TRU5fEES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FINAL REPORT ON RECENT INCi· 
DENTS AT UJAMAA HOUSE (1989) (describing racist incidents in a Stanford residence house and 
detailing the devastating emotional effect upon students of racist incidents in their residence 
house). These events are also discussed in Williams, supra note IO. 
256. In a compromise between equality of access and first amendment claims, Stanford Uni· 
versity proposed to regulate only hate speech directed against individuals or small groups of 
individuals. See Fundamental Standard, supra note 191, at I (including in the definition of har· 
assment by vilification the requirement that it be "addressed directly to the individual or individ· 
uals whom it insults" and that it insults "an individual or a small number of individuals"). 
Los Angeles hate crime reporting guidelines require a specific target such as an individual, a 
home, or a place of worship. Generalized hate crimes, such as freeway graffiti, are excluded. 
HATE CRIME IN L.A., supra note 80, at 5-6. 
In my experience, I never hear the next words after a racial slur against my group, Japanese 
Americans. I don't think a student can hear a racial slur on the way to a lecture, and then 
concentrate on the lecture as though nothing has happened. The lack of individual targeting 
does not guarantee a lack of individual harm. 
257. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limiting broadcast of obscene words to a 
captive audience); see also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (con· 
trol over unwanted mail allowed because of sanctity of the home). 
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offered to hate groups as a forum. 25s 
A related and literally captive group deserves mention here. The 
majority of prison inmates in many communities are people of color. 
Prisons are also fertile grounds for spreading racist hate speech. 
Courts have protected the rights of hate groups in prisons. 259 The 
physical vulnerability and inability to escape that characterizes prison 
life make restriction of hate speech in prisons more important than in 
the population at large. 
SUMMARY: EXPANDED RELEVANCE AND THE HARD CASES 
[T]erse epithets come down to our generation, weighted with hatreds 
accumulated through centuries of bloodshed. 260 
[I]f we want to be whole, we must recall the past, those parts which we 
want to remember, those parts which we want to forget. 261 
The cases discussed above are an effort to construct the conversa-
tion we might have if we take on the task of delineating and penalizing 
the most harmful class of racist speech. It is not an impossible conver-
sation. It is a different one, in that it suggests a highly contextualized 
analysis and a range of relevant evidence quite at odds with that found 
in typical legal inquiry.262 This evidence encompasses the particular-
ity of a victim's time and place as well as the experience of a victim's 
group over the course of time and space.263 It recognizes that the ex-
perience of racism, of persecution for membership in a group, makes 
the group's consciousness the victim's consciousness, all of which is 
relevant in assessing the harm of racist speech. 264 It makes relevant, 
258. Compare the case of public utilities. The state may not prohibit corporate actors from 
enclosing controversial messages in utility bill envelopes. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. 
Commn., 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
259. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Analysis in the Prison Context, 44 ALB. L. REV. 888 
(1980) (discussing Curle v. Ward, 46 N.Y.2d 1049, 389 N.E.2d 1070, 416 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979) 
(prison guard's right to join KKK upheld over Department of Correction's claim that African-
American inmates were terrorized by the Klan)). 
260. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 299 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
261. B. Christian, ''Somebody Forgot to Tell Somebody Something": African-American Wo-
men's Historical Novels. Paper delivered at the University of Hawaii 21 (Apr. 1989) (on file with 
author). 
262. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), demonstrates the Court's ability to marshal 
evidence of the level of racial strife in a community, and of the historical connection between 
racism and violence as it relates to a specific example of hate speech. It cites migration patterns, 
race riots, bombings, and the history of nativism and racial animosity in Chicago. 343 U.S. at 
259-62. 
263. Christine Littleton identifies contextuality in critical legal studies analysis: 
"(S]eparating the individual from her or his social context in litigation leaves out of a case the 
very elements that make the case necessary in the first place - unequal social power." Littleton, 
supra note 31, at 760. 
264. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in the Skokie case, suggested 
the possible continued applicability of Beauharnais, and quoted from Schenck. "the character of 
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then, knowledge as old as the Torah and as new as the back page of 
this morning's newspaper. It makes relevant, too, what has happened 
to you, to me, to an acquaintance, to a friend of a friend, to a person 
whom we have never met but who is tied to us as a survivor of the 
same hate. 
This deep historical consciousness lifts us out of the neutrality 
trap, that trap under which many states have passed anti-mask stat-
utes in a barely disguised effort to limit Ku Klux Klan activities.265 
These statutes purportedly cover the wearing of masks in general, with 
no specific mention of the intent to control the Klan. Neutral reasons, 
such as the need to prevent pickpockets from moving unidentified 
through crowds, or the need to demask burglars and bank robbers, are 
proffered for such statutes. 266 The result of forgetting - or pretend-
ing to forget - the real reason for antimask legislation is farcical. 
Masks are used in protest against terrorist regimes, for reasons of both 
symbolism and personal safety. Iranian students wearing masks and 
opposing human rights violations by the Shah of Iran, for example, 
were prosecuted under a California antimask statute.267 
This Article calls for an end of such unknowing. We know why 
state legislatures - those quirkily populist institutions - have passed 
anti-mask statutes. It is more honest, and less cynically manipulative 
of legal doctrine, to legislate openly against the worst forms of racist 
speech, allowing ourselves to know what we know. 
VIII. THE UNINTENDED STORY: THE MEANING OF LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF RACIST HATE MESSAGES 
The legal response to racist propaganda provides an interesting 
context for examination of the relation between law and racism. Legal 
protection of racism is seen in these doctrinal elements: 
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 416, 
419 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting from Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919)). 
265. See Johnson, Can the State Unmask the Clan?, KY. BENCH & BAR, Apr. 1981, at 8 
(citing statutes in California, Michigan, Kentucky, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. Some statutes contain useful exemp· 
tions for Halloween, Mardi Gras, and Gasparilla). 
The Village of Skokie's ban against parading in military uniforms was another failed attempt 
at neutrality. Everyone knew that the feared uniform was the Nazi storm trooper uniform. The 
courts easily attacked the overbreadth of the "no uniforms" rule. See Village of Skokie v. Na-
tional Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347, 354 (1977), modified on other 
grounds, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
266. Johnson, supra note 265 (citing City of Pineville v. Marshall, 222 Ky. 4, 299 S.W. 1072, 
1073 (1927) (fear of pickpockets and bandits justified use of police power to ban masks)). 
267. See Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1978) (over-
turning, on first amendment grounds, convictions for protesting while wearing masks). 
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(1) the limits of doctrinal imagination in creating first amendment 
exceptions for racist hate speech; 
(2) the refusal to recognize the competing values of liberty and 
equality at stake in the case of hate speech; and 
(3) the refusal to view the protection of racist speech as a form of 
state action. 
The limits of lawmaking imagination of judges, legislators, and 
other legal insiders who have considered proposals to outlaw hate 
propaganda is symptomatic of Derrick Bell's interest convergence the-
ory. 268 This limitation of imagination is a disability, a blindness, that 
prevents lawmakers from seeing that racist speech is a serious threat. 
Legal insiders cannot imagine a life disabled in a significant way by 
hate propaganda. 
This limited imagination has not affected lawmakers faced with 
other forms of offensive speech. Laws against dissemination of child 
pornography and the law of defamation and privacy are examples of 
areas in which the law recognizes that certain forms of expression are 
qualitatively different from the kind of speech deserving absolute pro-
tection. 269 The legal imagination is able to contemplate what it feels 
like to hear lies spread about one's professional competency,270 to have 
one's likeness used for commercial gain without consent,271 or to hear 
unwanted obscenities on the radio.272 American law has even, at 
times, provided a tort remedy for white plaintiffs who are "insulted" 
by "imputation of association with persons of a race to which there is 
prejudice."273 When the legal mind understands that reputational in-
terests, which are analogized to the preferred interest in property, 
268. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980) (arguing that reform on 
race issues occurs only when it serves majority interests). As one Atlanta official put it, "If 
blacks and Jews and other minorities were similarly organized for harassment of and violence to 
whites, the nation would be turning upside down." Opening Comments of Ms. Jan Douglas, 
Director, Community Relations Commission, City of Atlanta, at the Open Meeting on Racial 
and Religious Bigotry and Violence, Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 24, 1981, quoted in HATE GROUP AC-
TIVITY, supra note 61, at l. 
269. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747 (1982). Professor Frederick Schauer argues that the Ferber case is an example of 
the emerging willingness of the Supreme Court to devise different first amendment constructs for 
different categories of speech. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Fer-
ber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285; see also Sunstein, supra note 66 (arguing for a distinction between 
low value and high value speech). 
270. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 737_ (4th ed. 1971) (stating that 
"there is a great deal of the Jaw of defamation which makes no sense," and going on to describe 
the action of defamation). 
271. This concept was first imagined by Warren and Brandeis in their article The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
272. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
273. Annotation, Libel and Slander: Imputation of Association with Persons of Race or Na-
tionality as to Which There Is Social Prejudice, 121 A.L.R. 1151, 1151 (1939) (citing Sharp v. 
Bussey, 137 Fla. 96, 187 So. 779 (1939)). 
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must be balanced against first amendment interests, it recognizes the 
concrete reality of what happens to people who are defamed. Their 
lives are changed. Their standing in the community, their opportuni-
ties, their self-worth, their free enjoyment of life is limited. To see 
this, and yet to fail to see that the very same things happen to the 
victims of racist speech, is selective vision. 
The selective consideration of one victim's story and not another's 
results in unequal application of the law. Unlike the victims of defa-
mation and other torts, the victims of racist speech are not representa-
tive of the population at large. In making typical legal concessions to 
the first amendment, we burden a range of victims. In the case of flag-
buming, we force patriots, veterans, and flag-lovers of all races to tol-
erate flag desecration as part of the price of freedom. In contrast, 
when victims of racist speech are left to assuage their own wounds, we 
burden a limited class: the traditional victims of discrimination. This 
class already experiences diminished access to private remedies such as 
effective counterspeech, and this diminished access is exacerbated by 
hate messages. Debasing speech discredits targets, further reducing 
their ability to have their speech taken seriously.274 The application of 
absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, then, is a choice to 
burden one group with a disproportionate share of the costs of speech 
promotion.275 The principle of equality is violated by such alloca-
tion. 276 The more progressive principle of rectification or repara-
tion277 - the obligation to repair effects of historical wrongs - is even 
more grossly violated. 
The failure to hear the victim's story results in an inability to give 
weight to competing values of constitutional dimension.278 The com-
274. Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues, similarly, that pornography causes women to 
be taken less seriously as they enter the public arena. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, YALE L. 
& POLY. REV., Spring 1984, at 321; see also Sunstein, supra note 66, at 619 (analogizing the case 
for antipornography legislation to footnote four in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938), and recognizing "maldistribution of private power"). 
275. Tolerance of hate speech thus creates super-regressivity - those least able to pay are 
the only ones taxed for tolerance. Note that it is even more regressive than the typical sales tax, 
under which an equal percentage is applied to unequal payers. Under that system no one group 
is exclusively taxed. See also Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLER· 
ANCE 81 (1969); Cf Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A 
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1988) (history and normative evaluation of re-
gressive and progressive schemes of taxation in the United States). 
276. This contextualized understanding of equality is admittedly at odds with the conserva-
tive view of equality as equal treatment without regard to individual disadvantage. See, e.g., 
Washburn, Liberalism versus Free Speech, NATL. REV., Sept. 30, 1988, at 39 (comparing an 
African-American professor's complaints of harassment unfavorably to historical examples of 
toleration of insults generated by whites against whites). 
277. See Matsuda, supra note 20. 
278. As Detroit City Councilperson Mel Ravitz said in explanation of his support for a de-
nial of a park-use permit to the SS Action Group: 
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peting values recognized under international law are equality, liberty, 
and personality. Each person under that scheme is entitled to basic 
dignity, to nondiscrilliination, and to the freedom to participate fully 
in society.279 If there is any central principle to the Bill of Rights, 
surely that is it. When white supremacist organizations with histories 
of violence have an active, protected presence in a community, that 
principle is sacrificed. All our democratic institutions are tainted as a 
consequence. 280 As Professor Delgado has noted, the underlying first 
amendment values of self-fulfillment, knowledge, participation, and 
stable community recognized by first amendment theorists are sacri-
ficed when hate speech is protected.281 The constitutional commit-
ment to equality and the promise to abolish the badges and incidents 
of slavery are emptied of meaning282 when target-group members must 
alter their behavior, change their choice of neighborhood, leave their 
jobs, and warn their children off the streets because of hate group ac-
tivity. When the presence of the Klan deters employers from hiring 
target-group members, prevents citizens from socializing freely, and 
keeps parents from sending their children to integrated schools, the 
In addition to honoring the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, it is also the City 
Council's obligation to honor the rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments of the same Constitution. Those Amendments are the constitutional 
basis for "equality," which is as much a fundamental constitutional right as freedom of 
speech. 
National Alliance Against Racist & Political Repression, Now Is the Time: Outlaw the KKK, 
Nazis, and Other Hate Groups, ORGANIZER, June/July 1986, at 2, 7 .. 
279. Fanny Drake Crumsey of Chattanooga, Tennessee, the victim of a random Klan shoot-
ing spree on April 19, 1980, expressed the claim to personhood succinctly: 
I think that I have the right and the privilege to sit on my porch, plant flowers in my 
yard, and visit my neighbors freely, without any physical or mental abuse. That includes 
not being shot at, shot, or any other form of danger to me, a peaceful law-abiding citizen of 
this and any other community. 
SOUTHERN ORGANIZING COMMITTEE & SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 
CHALLENGE TO AMERICA: VICTIMS OF RACIST VIOLENCE TELL THEIR STORIES 3 (1981). 
For a classic discussion of the denial of personhood engendered by a racist environment, see 
W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 25. 
280. The jury system, for example, is suspect when racist speech enters jury deliberations. 
See Note, Racist Slurs by Jurors as Ground for Impeaching a Jury's Verdict: State v. Shillcut, 
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1481 (In State v. Shillcut, 119 Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984) the court 
denied a new trial in spite of a juror's comment to the effect that the defendant was African-
American and therefore probably guilty.). 
281. Delgado, supra note 6; see also supra text accompanying note 54. Self-fulfillment is 
sacrificed when racial insults are internalized by victims and perpetrators - both groups are 
denied the ability to choose to live in harmony. 
282. See Jones, supra note 22, at 433-34; Professor Charles Lawrence has argued that Brown 
v. Board of Education was really about racist speech. Segregation was wrong, the Court found, 
because of the message of inferiority communicated by segregation. The Court in Brown limited 
the expression of an idea. See Beyers, Lawyers Debate !st Amendment Limits, Interpretation of 
Fundamental Standard, Stanford University Campus Report, Apr. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 1, at 6, col. 
1 (quoting Charles Lawrence); see also Lawrence, "One More River to Cross" - Recognizing the 
Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 48 (D. Bell ed. 1980). 
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goal of nondiscrimination is moved farther away from present reali-
ties. When hate propaganda spreads attitudes of racism and desensi-
tizes potential abusers to the wrongness of violence, other more 
obvious goals of safety and order are sacrificed. 
The third doctrinal pillar supporting racist speech is the refusal to 
recognize that tolerance and protection of hate group activities by the 
government is a form of state action. To allow an organization known 
for violence, persecution, race hatred, and commitment to racial 
supremacy to exist openly, and to provide police protection and access 
to public streets and college campuses for such a group, means that 
the state is promoting racist speech. If not for such support, hate 
groups would decline in efficacy. The chilling sight of avowed racists 
in threatening regalia marching through our neighborhoods with full 
police protection is a statement of state authorization.283 The Klan 
marches because marching promotes the Klan, and because of the ter-
rorizing and inciting effect of its public displays. Open display con-
veys legitimacy. The government advances this effect when it protects 
these marches. In addition, the failure to provide a legal response lim-
iting hate propaganda elevates liberty interests of racists over liberty 
interests of targets. A member of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 
for example, once suggested to whites targeted for hate speech because 
of their association with African Americans that they should avoid 
being seen in cars with African Americans, and cease inviting African 
Americans to their homes. 284 
The effect of racist propaganda is to devalue the individual and to 
treat masses of people in a degraded way with no measure of individ-
ual merit. This is precisely what civil libertarians oppose when the 
state acts. 285 Because racist speech is seen as private, the connection 
to loss of liberty is not made. State silence, however, is public action 
where the strength of the new racist groups derives from their offering 
legitimation and justification for otherwise socially unacceptable emo-
tions of hate, fear, and aggression. 286 The need for a formal group, for 
283. In fact, the historical connection between hate groups and the state is more than pas· 
sive; law enforcement officers have been active as well as passive participants in groups like the 
KKK. See P. SIMS, supra note 1, at 245-48 (deputy sherriff convicted in killing of three civil 
rights workers in Mississippi). 
284. HATE GROUP ACTIVITY, supra note 61, at 21. 
285. See, e.g .. Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A 
Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595 
(1985). The Klan has also raised objections to generalized searches. See Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 
F. Supp. 403 (D. Conn. 1984) (KKK challenges generalized weapons search of attendees at 
KKK rallies). 
286. See H. KITANO, supra note 68, at 113 (discussion of displaced aggression and racial 
discrimination). See generally D. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVJST MOVE· 
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a patriotic cause, and for an elevation of the doubting self are part of 
the traditional attraction of groups like the Klan. Government protec-
tion of the right of the Klan to exist publicly and to spread a racist 
message promotes the role of the Klan as a legitimizer of racism. 287 
Further, the law's failure to provide recourse to persons who are 
demeaned by the hate messages is an effective second injury to that 
person.288 The second injury is the pain of knowing that the govern-
ment provides no remedy, and offers no recognition of the dehumaniz-
ing experience that victims of hate propaganda are subjected to.289 
The government's denial of personhood by denying legal recourse may 
be even more painful than the initial act of hatred. One can dismiss 
the hate group as an organization of marginal people, but the state is 
the official embodiment of the society we live in. 
The legal realists and their progeny recognize that law formation is 
largely a matter of value. 290 There are no inevitable results; there is no 
controlling logic or doctrine that can make the hard choices for us. 
Reversion to discredited doctrinal absolutism carries a strong implica-
tion that racist activities are supported, albeit unintentionally, by the 
law. In a society that expresses its moral judgments through the law, 
and in which the rule of law and the use of law are characteristic re-
sponses to many social phenomena, this absence of laws against racist 
speech is telling. 
We can defy the proposition that racism is part of law by opening 
our eyes to the reality of racism and making the decision to outlaw 
hate groups. We can draw from the international standard and ac-
knowledge the competing interests at stake, adapting existing law and 
creating new law to limit hate group activities. It is not necessary to 
abandon first amendment values in order to do this. The analytical 
MENTS TO THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1988) (historical fear of sinister enemies as 
impetus for racist movements). 
287. Racist organizations are also eligible for attorneys' fees when they challenge govern-
ment limitations of racist speech. Targets are thus further taxed for exercise of Klan speech. 
See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 735 F.2d 895 
(5th Cir. 1984) (upholding award of attorneys' fees where KKK challenged the board's denial of 
school facilities to racist groups). 
288. Cf R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 81-146 (1965) (discussing the second injury 
caused when accident victims strike the interior of their own cars). As Professor David 
Kretzmer has argued, "a society committed to ideals of social and political equality cannot re-
main passive: it must issue unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulnerable minority groups 
and make positive statements affirming its commitments to those ideals." Kretzmer, supra note 
36, at 456. 
289. See Delgado, supra note 6. 
290. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1236 (1931) ("The conception of Jaw as a means to social ends and not an end in 
itself"). 
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dexterity of legal thinkers offers many options for reconciling the 
American position with the international goal of elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. 
Professor Massaro in her contribution to this symposium chal-
lenges us to choose among stories, among values. This Article sug-
gests that the stories of those who have experienced ra~ism are of 
special value in defeating racism. It further suggests that we can, and 
have, chosen as a primary value freedom from racial oppression. Fi-
nally, in doing the awkward work of constructing doctrine, this Arti-
cle suggests a belief in the possibility and the necessity of creating a 
legal response to racist speech that transcends first amendment absolu-
tism. We can attack racist speech - not because it isn't really speech, 
not because it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, but because it 
is wrong. 
There is, in every constitutional doctrine we devise, the danger of 
misuse. For fear of falling, we are warned against taking a first step. 
Frozen at the first amendment bulkhead we watch the rising tide of 
racial hatred wash over our schools and work places. Students victim-
ized by racist speech tum to university administrations for redress, 
and are told that the first amendment forecloses institutional action. 
We owe those students a more thoughtful analysis than absolutism. 
At the least, before we abandon the task of devising a legal response to 
racist speech, we should consider concretely the options available to 
us. The legal imagination is a fruitful one. That is the one hopeful 
message of the postmodern critique of law. Nothing inherent in law 
ties our hands, and lawyers, through the ages, have displayed abun-
dant skills of invention. 
CONCLUSION 
The emerging jurisprudence of outsiders uses the experience of 
subordination to offer a phenomenology of race and law. The victims' 
experience reminds us that the harm of racist hate messages is a real 
harm, to real people. When the legal system offers no redress for that 
real harm, it perpetuates racism. 
This Article attempts to begin a conversation about the first 
amendment that acknowledges both the civil libertarian's fear of tyr-
anny and the victims' experience of loss of liberty in a society that 
tolerates racist speech. It suggests criminalization of a narrow, explic-
itly defined class of racist hate speech, to provide public redress for the 
most serious harm, while leaving many forms of racist speech to pri-
vate remedies. Some may feel this proposal does not go far enough, 
leaving much hurtful speech to the uneven control of the marketplace 
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of ideas. Others will cringe at what they perceive as a call for censor-
ship. This is not an easy legal or moral puzzle, but it is precisely in 
these places where we feel conflicting tugs at heart and mind that we 
have the most work to do and the most knowledge to gain. 
We are a legalized culture. If law is where racism is, then law is 
where we must confront it. The doctrinal reconstruction presented 
here is tentative and subject to change as our struggle around this issue 
continues. However we choose to respond to racist speech, let us pres-
ent a competing ideology, one that has existed in tension with racism 
since the birth of our nation: there is inherent worth in each human 
being, and each is entitled to a life of dignity. 
